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SURVEILLANCE POLICY MAKING BY PROCUREMENT
Catherine Crump *
Abstract: In Seattle, the police obtained a surveillance drone with the approval of a city
council that did not realize what it was doing. In Oakland, following a council review that
lasted literally two minutes, the city created a data integration center that networked together
all of its existing surveillance infrastructure. In San Diego, elected representatives were only
dimly aware that the law enforcement agency they supervised had built and deployed
innovative facial recognition technology.
In an age of heightened concern about the militarization of local police and surveillance
technology, how do local law enforcement agencies obtain cutting edge and potentially
intrusive surveillance equipment without elected leaders and the general public realizing it?
The answer lies in the process of federal procurement, through which the federal
government, often in the name of combatting terrorism, funnels billions of dollars to local
law enforcement agencies that can then be used to purchase surveillance equipment. But the
federal government does not take steps to ensure that local elected representatives and
members of the public are involved in decisions about what technologies to acquire, or that
anyone develops a protocol to constrain how the technologies are used. Surveillance policy
making by procurement thus raises a host of questions about accountability for policy
choices when the federal government influences local policing through grants, but does not
address all relevant concerns and how to deal with the inevitable spillover effects of the
federal government’s national security initiatives on the ways local law enforcement agents
carry out their more routine policing functions.
This Article is the first to comprehensively consider the intersection of procurement and
local surveillance policy making. Using case studies from Seattle, Oakland, and San Diego, it
exposes the practice of surveillance policy making by procurement. The case studies
highlight the structural and institutional factors that lead to surveillance policy making by
procurement, and elected representatives’ responses to it point the way towards policy
solutions that would bring a greater measure of transparency and accountability to local
surveillance policy making. The case studies also provide fodder for thinking through the
way federal spending programs can generate confusion over who is responsible for policy
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choices and how the federal government’s national security policies have spillover effects on
the conduct of routine policing.
Local communities vary greatly in their crime rates, the competence and trustworthiness
of their police departments, and their political convictions. This Article draws on the case
studies to suggest that local governments have a valuable role to play in tailoring surveillance
policy to local conditions. It concludes by proposing politically feasible steps to strengthen
local democratic input regarding what surveillance technology should be adopted and the
conditions under which it should be deployed.
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INTRODUCTION
One day some of us showed up [to] committee and there were
some objects on [the] table. It turns out they were drones. We
didn’t even know we owned drones. We looked at each other
[and asked], where did these come from? And then someone
said, oh, you approved it two years ago. 1
—Seattle City Council Member Nick Licata
The heavily militarized response to those protesting the police
shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri generated real shock
among members of the public, who did not realize that the federal
government provided military-grade weapons and equipment to local
law enforcement agencies. In the aftermath, the White House conducted
a top-to-bottom review of federal support for local law enforcement
equipment acquisition. 2 It concluded that “training has not been
institutionalized, specifically with respect to civil rights and civil
liberties protections[.]” 3 It also found that “[l]ocal elected officials are
frequently not involved in the decision-making” about what technology
their police forces acquire, and the general public is “unaware of what
their [law enforcement agencies] possess.” 4

1. Seattle City Council, Full Council, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 1:07:25 (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-council/full-council?videoid=x22150
(last
visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of councilmember Nick Licata).
2. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REVIEW: FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT EQUIPMENT ACQUISITION (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/docs/federal_support_for_local_law_enforcement_equipment_acquisition.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YCV2-TXN7] (reviewing federal funding and programs that provide equipment to
state and local law enforcement agencies); Mark Landler, Obama Offers New Standards on Police
Gear in Wake of Ferguson Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/12/02/us/politics/obama-to-toughen-standards-on-police-use-of-military-gear.html
[https://
perma.cc/6HXL-QL7A] (describing administration response to public disapproval of federal
programs viewed as promoting militarization of police).
3. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Id. at 4.

08 - Crump.docx (Do Not Delete)

1598

12/20/2016 12:52 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1595

These statements are equally true of federal programs promoting the
acquisition of surveillance equipment. The primary difference is that
while the public does eventually witness the use of force, surveillance,
by its nature, remains largely invisible. Yet surveillance equipment is
also susceptible to abuse. The federal government’s role in promoting its
use merits close attention. This Article begins that work.
Federal agencies make considerable funds available to local law
enforcement agencies, in the form of grants, to acquire surveillance
technologies. Congress substantially increased the amount of funding
available in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, reflecting the view that
local cooperation was essential to prevent future incidents of terrorism. 5
Its interest in enhancing the capabilities of local law enforcement
agencies is likely to increase because anti-terrorism experts are
convinced that Orlando and San Bernardino-style “home-grown”
terrorist incidents are now a substantial threat to our security and safety. 6
By influencing the process of procurement, the federal government
can entice local police departments—over which it has no formal
control—to enhance their surveillance capabilities in line with federal
priorities. But this approach, which this Article refers to as surveillance
policy making by procurement, has a variety of additional consequences.
For the most part, local law enforcement agencies are directed and
controlled by locally elected government officials, who are in turn
subject to the pressures of local public opinion. Surveillance policy
making by procurement can short-circuit this process when elected
officials and the public are left without a meaningful understanding of
what technologies their law enforcement agency is acquiring. This can
create a governance void, in which law enforcement agencies deploy
powerful surveillance technologies in ways that may conflict with local
political preferences. Moreover, because the same surveillance
technologies that are useful in investigating terrorism are also useful in
investigating more routine forms of criminal conduct, federal programs
created with the War on Terror in mind can have significant effects on
standard law enforcement work.

5. See infra Part II.
6. According to Matthew G. Olsen, former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the
Boston Marathon bombing highlighted the “danger posed by lone actors and insular groups not
directly tied to terrorist organizations, as well as the difficulty of identifying these types of plots
before they take place.” Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff.,
The Homeland Threat Landscape and U.S. Response, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Matthew
G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center).
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To better understand surveillance policy making by procurement, this
Article develops three case studies: Seattle’s acquisition of a drone and
deployment of a “mesh network”; Oakland’s construction of a “domain
awareness center”; and San Diego’s rollout of facial recognition
technology. The technologies that Seattle, Oakland, and San Diego
acquired are not marginal improvements on existing tools. 7 All
substantially increase the capacity of a law enforcement agency to
collect, store, analyze, and share information about individuals, with a
potentially significant, negative impact on privacy. Using a drone, a law
enforcement agent can conduct aerial surveillance of an area as soon as
it becomes of interest. A mesh network—a wireless infrastructure that
connects cameras and other devices—has the potential to significantly
increase video surveillance of public places and to track anyone carrying
a wi-fi-enabled device. Integrating sensor data into a domain awareness
center—a hub that integrates surveillance data from cameras and other
networked sensors—raises the prospect of substantially expanding the
analysis and sharing of data initially collected for different purposes.
Facial recognition technology has the potential to allow any officer with
a smartphone to snap a photo of another person and ascertain that
person’s identity, which is key to accessing a wealth of other
information, such as criminal history and threat assessment score.
This Article draws on available public information to demonstrate
that the phenomenon of surveillance policy making by procurement is
widespread and merits attention. It is the first piece of legal scholarship
to focus on the impact of federal procurement programs on local
surveillance policy making. 8 The Article focuses on salient examples,
but the quantity of federal funding available suggests its broader
importance.
Part I explains the scope of the federal government’s involvement in
local law enforcement agencies’ procurement of surveillance
technology. The Part both documents the billions of dollars of federal
funding available to local law enforcement agencies to purchase
surveillance technologies and builds on the scholarship of others to
demonstrate the already substantial, and likely expanding, interest of the
7. There is wide recognition that digital technology has vastly expanded the capacity for the
collection, retention, analysis, and sharing of data. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment
as Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (“Technology has made it easier than
ever to collect, combine, share, and retain massive amounts of data and to search the resulting
datasets.”).
8. Taking a broader view, Rachel A. Harmon has addressed the distortions federal funding
programs can create in conducting cost-benefit analyses of local policing programs. See Rachel A.
Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2015).
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federal government in enhancing the capabilities of local law
enforcement agencies. Part II introduces the three case studies—Seattle,
Oakland, and San Diego—that provide more detailed accounts of
surveillance policy making by procurement. These case studies
demonstrate the structural and institutional factors that contribute to
surveillance policy making by procurement as well as its consequences
for local governance of police surveillance. The policy changes local
elected officials implemented in the three case studies point the way
toward reforms that bring local surveillance policy in line with local
crime conditions, the competence and trustworthiness of the police
department, and local political preferences.
Part III takes a theoretical turn. It identifies factors that should be
considered when optimizing surveillance policy. While there is no onesize-fits-all solution to how a surveillance technology should be utilized,
every surveillance scheme raises the same basic questions about how
data is collected, retained, used, and shared. The absence of a technology
use policy that hits these basic points—and especially the failure to draft
any policy at all—should be cause for concern.
The Part then draws on two bodies of scholarship to explore aspects
of accountability for local surveillance policy choices. In the case
studies, federal involvement weakened local democratic control over
local surveillance policy without offering any replacement. The Supreme
Court has privileged federal interventions in the form of conditional
grants-in-aid, such as those in the case studies, over federal interventions
that commandeer state and local officials precisely because of its view
that spending programs do a better job of preserving clear lines of
accountability. But the case studies show that federal spending programs
can generate considerable confusion over who is responsible for policy
choices and provide reason to question the factual basis of the distinction
the Court has drawn. Next, the Part situates the case studies within the
federal government’s broader efforts to work more closely with local
law enforcement agencies to prevent, investigate, and respond to acts of
terror. Particularly, given the dual-purpose nature of much surveillance
technology, these initiatives have significant impacts not just on
combatting terrorism but also on how local officers conduct routine
policing. This suggests that any cost-benefit analysis of the federal
government’s national security programs should consider not only their
impact on national security, but also their impact on law enforcement,
including on transparency and accountability.
Finally, Part IV makes the case that local elected officials’ familiarity
with local circumstances positions them particularly well to set local
surveillance policy. It sets out some policy proposals for enhancing local
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input over surveillance choices and ensuring that the use of surveillance
technology is governed by policies that take into account bedrock data
management principles. This menu of reform options includes actions at
the federal, state, and local levels. These actions would bring an
increased measure of local democratic decision making to local
surveillance policy.
I.

FEDERAL FUNDING OF LOCAL SURVEILLANCE

In her scholarship on policing and its regulation, Rachel Harmon has
observed that federal support for local law enforcement in the form of
money, equipment, personnel, and power “is far more extensive than its
civil rights enforcement and has an enormous and understudied impact
on policing.” 9 The response to the events of 9/11 extended this support
even further. As national security scholar Matthew Waxman explained,
“[o]nce a major component of the national security threat was seen as
residing or operating within U.S. borders, local police agencies were an
obvious resource for the federal government to turn to given the vastness
of the intelligence challenge.” 10
After 9/11, the federal government established or expanded a number
of programs to provide equipment and training to help state and local
law enforcement agencies.11 A quick tally of just the most major federal
programs indicates that they have made tens of billions of dollars
9. Id. at 872.
10. Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L. REV.
289, 305 (2012); see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA & KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
DOMESTIC FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION: THROUGH THE LENS OF THE SOUTHWEST
BORDER 16 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43583.pdf [http://perma.cc/G5QUWVM2] (identifying “a broad recognition that state and local law enforcement and public safety
agencies play significant roles in homeland security—especially stopping terrorist plots.”). For
example, the federal government significantly expanded the number of joint terrorism taskforces
around the country. Of the 104 such taskforces that bring together federal and local law enforcement
personnel to investigate terrorism, 71 were created after September 11, 2001. See Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/terrorism
[https://perma.cc/5MGD-NUZS]. Also, the federal government has funded the establishment of a
network of information fusion centers to serve as “focal points for the receipt, analysis, gathering,
and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal,
territorial [] and private sector partners.” State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (June 16, 2016), http://www.dhs.gov/state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers
[https://perma.cc/J6TV-2FHL].
11. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 2 (“Particularly in the years since
September 11, 2001, Congress and the Executive Branch have steadily increased spending and
support for [equipment for state and local law enforcement agencies], in light of legitimate concerns
about the growing threat of terrorism, shrinking local budgets, and the relative ease with which
some criminals are able to obtain high-powered weapons.”).
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available for this purpose. It is challenging to understand the impact of
this funding on local surveillance practices because few programs collect
statistics on how funding is distributed across categories of equipment
(e.g., surveillance, weaponry) and training. However, the sheer quantity
of money suggests these programs’ importance.
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
administers a substantial number of programs that give grants to law
enforcement agencies:
The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) provides support to
state governments and agencies for planning, organizing, equipping,
training, and exercising capabilities and procedures to “prevent, protect
against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from” terrorist and other
threats. 12 Between fiscal years 2003 and 2014, the program awarded
$9.9 billion in grant funds. 13
The Urban Areas Security Initiative has similar goals to the SHSP,
but focuses on the needs of “high-threat, high-density Urban Areas[.]” 14
Between fiscal years 2003 and 2014, the program awarded $8.4 billion
in grant funds. 15
The Port Security Grant Program, available to 360 ports, has
distributed nearly $2.9 billion since its inception in January 2002. 16
Operation Stonegarden, dedicated to border security, 17 has disbursed
$361 million between 2008 and 2014. 18
In addition to DHS programs, the Department of Justice (DOJ) also
administers grants to state and local governments. For example, its
Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program is the biggest source of federal

12. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, HOMELAND SECURITY
GRANT PROGRAM 4 (2014), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1395161200285-5b07ed0456
056217175fbdee28d2b06e/FY_2014_HSGP_FOA_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G6FL-MYM8]
[hereinafter HSGP FOA].
13. Catherine Crump, Statistical Compendium, http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2633/
[perma.cc/AE42-HXYK].
14. HSGP FOA, supra note 12, at 4.
15. Crump, supra note 13.
16. See id. (outlining calculations and sources underlying figure).
17. HSGP FOA, supra note 12, at 4.
18. Crump, supra note 13.
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justice funding to state and local jurisdictions. 19 The program granted a
total of nearly $3.8 billion between 2003 and 2014. 20
How are state and local law enforcement agencies using these funds
for surveillance? Again, information is incomplete, but accounts of the
JAG program, one of the few that releases information on equipment
purchased with its grants, indicated that in the 2012 program year, 113
state and local governments used JAG funds to purchase license plate
readers, 371 purchased video observation equipment, 284 purchased
undercover surveillance equipment, and 619 purchased on-car or bodyworn cameras. 21
Lists of equipment eligible for purchase under various grants offer
additional clues about how federal money is spent. The DHS federally
authorized equipment list, which sets out what local law enforcement
agencies are authorized to purchase under a broad range of grant
programs, includes a wide array of “[s]urveillance equipment and related
accessories,” including audio, data, and visual equipment. 22 It
specifically mentions: (1) equipment for surveillance of telephone
communications; (2) devices to extract data from cell phones; (3)
cameras; and (4) infrared illumination equipment. 23
As mentioned previously, although the federal government has
provided incentives for the expanded use of surveillance equipment by
local law enforcement agencies, it has not offered any systematic
guidance on the appropriate uses of this technology, and federal
programs generally have not required that local elected officials decide
on surveillance technology acquisitions. 24 For example, in the case
studies that follow, localities obtained funds from two DHS programs,
the Urban Areas Security Initiative and the Port Security Grant Program,

19. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EDWARD BYRNE JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2016),
https://www.bja.gov/Publications/JAG_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3RJ-BYH7].
20. Crump, supra note 13. In addition to the DHS and DOJ, the U.S. Department of Defense also
works to disseminate surveillance equipment to state and local law enforcement agencies. For
example, as of December 2014 there were 44,275 of its night vision goggles in the possession of
local law enforcement agencies. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 2, at 8.
21. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, GRANT ACTIVITY REPORT, JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM (APRIL 2012 – MARCH 2013) 4 (2013), https://www.bja.gov/
Publications/JAG_LE_Grant_Activity_03-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM4E-BS2B].
22. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DHS AUTHORIZED
EQUIPMENT LIST 121 (2012), http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1825-250457138/fema_preparedness_grants_authorized_equipment_list.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT27-FFF5].
23. Id.
24. See supra Introduction.
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and one DOJ grant program, designed to facilitate information-led
policing. 25 None of the statutes or regulations governing these programs
require the involvement of local elected officials. 26
II.

MUNICIPAL SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY
ACQUISITION: THREE CASE STUDIES

This Part develops a detailed account of surveillance policy making
by procurement through the examination of three case studies: Seattle’s
acquisition of a drone and construction of a mesh network, Oakland’s
construction of a domain awareness center, and San Diego’s
development of facial recognition technology. The case studies suggest
some of the structural and institutional factors that lead local police
departments to acquire surveillance technologies without participation
by elected representatives or the general public. The policy solutions
local elected representatives have devised also serve as a starting point
for consideration of how to bring a greater measure of local control,
transparency, and accountability to local surveillance policy. Moreover,
the case studies provide concrete illustrations of how federal spending
programs can generate considerable confusion over who is responsible
for policy choices and how federal programs with the purpose of
enhancing national security can have their biggest impact on more
routine policing practices.
A word about case selection is advisable. The case studies of Seattle,
Oakland, and San Diego were chosen because a substantial amount of
information is available about them, which is not often true when the
topic under consideration is surveillance technology acquisition. In each
case, a media entity or a non-profit organization uncovered an instance
25. See infra section II.A (describing Seattle’s receipt of funding from the Urban Areas Security
Initiative and Port Security Grant Program); section II.B (describing Oakland’s receipt of funding
from the Port Security Grant Program); section II.C (describing San Diego’s receipt of funding from
an information-led policing grant).
26. Urban Areas Security Initiative, 6 U.S.C. § 604 (2012); 46 U.S.C. § 70107 (2012) (statute
governing port security grants); 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.318–200.326 (regulations applicable to
procurement by non-federal entities that are not states). See also Memorandum from Bryan E.
Kamoie, Assistant Adm’r for Grant Programs, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, to All State
Administrative Agency Head et al. (Dec. 23, 2014), https://www.fema.gov/media-librarydata/1419366341862-296dd0cc30bbf64a6b45581afe9d8b17/InformationBulletin400 2CFRPart200
_FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/SJS2-ZAAX] (stating that the Urban Areas Security Initiative and Port
Security Grant Program are governed by the regulations contained at 2 C.F.R. § 200); Letter from
Michael L. Alston, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, to Pamela Scanlon, Doctor, Automated Reg’l
Justice Info. Sys., 1 (Sept. 13, 2007), https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/01_-_tacids_award
Z_letter_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PVX-DUSL] (describing the sources of authority supporting the
grant funds).
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where a law enforcement agency acquired a surveillance technology
without consulting members of the public or elected representatives.
And in each case, consistent media coverage, the availability of public
records, or a combination of the two meant there was adequate
information to examine how members of the public and elected
representatives responded.
Given this selection methodology, the case studies cannot be used to
draw causal inferences regarding surveillance policy making by
procurement. 27 They are nonetheless adequate to the task of this Article,
which is to identify structural and institutional features that characterize
policy making by procurement. To the extent that other municipalities
have similar features, the case studies suggest that an examination of
whether surveillance policy making by procurement is occurring may be
warranted.
A.

Seattle Acquires a Drone and a Mesh Network

In 2013, the Seattle City Council passed an ordinance, the first of its
kind, requiring city agencies to obtain council approval prior to
deploying surveillance technology and to accompany such requests for
approval with a specific proposal for how data would be collected,
retained, used, and shared. This was prompted by a strong, negative
public reaction to the police department’s secret acquisition of two
federally funded surveillance technologies: a surveillance drone 28 and a
mesh network. 29 The public response to both technologies was so
negative, strongly felt, and sustained that the mayor at the time acceded
to the opposition and terminated the programs. 30 This was not the first
27. See generally GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY 56 (1994) (describing as a fundamental goal of descriptive inference “to distinguish the
systematic component from the nonsystematic component of the phenomena we study”); id. at 75–
76 (distinguishing descriptive inference from causal inference).
28. Christine Clarridge, Waterfront Surveillance Cameras Stir Privacy Fears, SEATTLE TIMES
(Jan. 31, 2013, 8:45 PM) http://seattletimes.com/html/latestnews/2020260670_waterfrontcamera
sxml.html [https://perma.cc/ZV47-LBML].
29. A wireless mesh network is a wireless network consisting of multiple nodes that relay data.
See, e.g., Mesh Networking, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mesh_networking [https://
perma.cc/H2KP-7N5G]. The network was to be spread throughout downtown Seattle, and was to
have a variety of functions, including facilitating data transmission from thirty new surveillance
cameras. See Christine Clarridge, Protesters Steal the Show at Seattle Police Gathering to Explain
Intended Use of Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct 25, 2012, 10:54 PM), http://www.
seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protesters-steal-the-show-at-seattle-police-gathering-to-explainintended-use-of-drones/ [https://perma.cc/LP6N-JS2Z].
30. See Christine Clarridge, Seattle Grounds Police Drone Program, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 7,
2013, 9:33 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020312864_spddronesxml.html [https://
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time the Seattle Police Department’s surveillance initiatives became
embroiled in controversy. Several years earlier, the police department
installed surveillance cameras in public parks, without the consent of the
council, by finding an alternate source of funding after the council
refused to provide funding. 31 The secretive manner in which the police
acquired the surveillance technologies contributed to public opposition
and may well have undermined some valuable programs that could have
been implemented in a less contentious environment. 32
1.

History of Police Surveillance in Seattle

In 2008, the police department activated three cameras in Seattle’s
Cal Anderson Park, a sizeable urban park in the city’s Capitol Hill
neighborhood. 33 The city council had prohibited certain funding sources
from being used to finance cameras. 34 But because it did not technically
prohibit surveillance cameras in parks, the police department found other
funding to install the cameras, and did so, ultimately without informing
the city council. 35 It did not take long for members of the public to spot
the cameras and start asking questions. When council members realized
they had been circumvented, they were upset both with the lack of
transparency and the department’s failure to address basic data
management issues, such as how long video footage would be kept and
how it would be used. 36
perma.cc/6XV7-RP3A]; Jon Humbert, City Leaders Raising Questions About Seattle Surveillance
Plan, KOMO NEWS (Feb. 14. 2013), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/City-leaders-raisingquestions-about-Seattle-surveillance-plan-191352151.html [https://perma.cc/VW6F-WRGY].
31. See Bob Young, Surveillance Cameras Installed in Seattle’s Cal Anderson Park, SEATTLE
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2008) http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/surveillance-cameras-installed-inseattles-cal-anderson-park/ [https://perma.cc/2H54-CCS6].
32. See id. During this time, tensions between the police and residents were already high. In 2011,
the DOJ announced an investigation of the Seattle Police Department. Complaint ¶ 19, United
States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-cv-01282-JLR (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/31/spd_complaint_7-27-12.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7A4E-UAFY]. It did so after several widely publicized instances of police officers
allegedly using excessive force against individuals, especially minorities and persons with
disabilities. Id. at ¶ 18. The DOJ found that the police department routinely used excessive force and
followed policing practices that could lead to discriminatory policing. Letter from Thomas E. Perex,
Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., and Jenny A. Durkan, United States Attorney, W. Dist.
of Wash., to Michel McGinn, Mayor, City of Seattle 3 (Dec. 16, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2011/12/16/spd_findletter_12-16-11.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9GF4-8ASB].
33. Bob Young, supra note 31.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Despite this rocky start, the Seattle city council went along with a
proposal to install cameras in three additional parks for a twenty-onemonth period to test whether the cameras would have a meaningful
impact on crime. 37 After a city auditor concluded that there was no
evidence that the cameras had reduced crime, the council ordered them
removed. 38
This experience made city council members particularly skeptical
when, a few years later, the police department’s acquisition of a drone
and a mesh camera network came before them for oversight.
2.

The Drone and Mesh Network Controversies

In 2010, the Seattle Police Department acquired a surveillance
drone. 39 The drone was essentially a remote-controlled, miniature
helicopter that weighed just over two pounds and could remain airborne
for about ten minutes while live-streaming footage to law enforcement
agents. 40 While it could zoom in on a subject, its magnification was
about as powerful as that of a standard point-and-click camera. 41 It was
also quite loud, precluding the possibility of surreptitious surveillance. 42
It is hard to see this particular drone as a civil liberties threat or as a
significant benefit to law enforcement. Given its limited range and

37. Sharon Pian Chan, 3 More Seattle Parks to Get Security Cameras, SEATTLE TIMES (June 10,
2008)
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/3-more-seattle-parks-to-get-security-cameras/
[https://perma.cc/97CH-KAXP]. The city spent approximately $406,000 installing the cameras. Id.
Subsequent budget cuts ultimately made it impossible to maintain the cameras in all but Cal
Anderson Park. Lauren Padgett, Seattle to Take New Look at Cal Anderson Surveillance Cameras,
CAPITOL HILL SEATTLE BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 11:11 PM), http://www.capitolhillseattle.com/
2010/03/seattle-to-take-new-look-at-cal-anderson-surveillance-cameras/
[https://perma.cc/ZY43VMNX].
38. Timetable Set for Cal Anderson Cam Removal: Surveillance Tech to be Redeployed, CAPITOL
HILL SEATTLE BLOG (Sept. 27, 2010, 5:02 PM), http://www.capitolhillseattle.com/2010/
09/timetable-set-for-cal-anderson-cam-removal-surveillance-tech-to-be-redeployed/ [https://perma.
cc/MT62-5ETA].
39. See Lynn Thompson, Police Apologize for Not Keeping Council in Loop on New Drones,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 2, 2012), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/police-apologize-for-notkeeping-council-in-loop-on-new-drones/ [https://perma.cc/7RVQ-2T8P]; PUB. SAFETY, CIVIL
RIGHTS & TECH. COMM., CITY OF SEATTLE, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS 3 (2012), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~public/meetingrecords/2012/
pscrt20120502_1a.pdf [http://perma.cc/J2DA-WYC6]; Memorandum from John Diaz, Chief,
Seattle Police Dep’t, to Sally Clark, President, Seattle City Council, and Seattle City Council
Comm. on Pub. Safety, Civil Rights & Tech. 1 (May 1, 2012) (on file with author).
40. Thompson, supra note 39; CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 39, at 4.
41. See CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 39, at 4.
42. See id.
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capabilities, it has more in common with toy drones currently available
commercially for a few hundred dollars than with its military brethren.
The department purchased the drone with some $82,500 of federal
money, funds that comprised a small sliver of a 2008 grant from the
DHS. 43 The grant came from the Urban Areas Security Initiative, which,
as discussed earlier, is devoted to helping high-density, high-threat urban
areas prevent and recover from acts of terror. 44 The city council had
authorized the police chief to accept about $3.6 million to “provide
training for Seattle’s first responders to further enhance their ability to
respond to, and aid in the recovery from, threats or acts of terrorism.” 45
It did not mention acquiring a drone.
City council members found out about the drone in the same way as
everyone else: from the media. In January 2012, a San Francisco-based
advocacy organization, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), sued
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to obtain records regarding
drone flights in the United States.46 When the FAA disclosed a list of
authorized drone users a few months later, the Seattle Police Department
was on the list. 47 Media outlets covered the department’s acquisition of
the drone prominently. 48 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)

43. Memorandum from John Diaz, supra note 39, at 1; Memorandum from Christa Valles,
Council Cent. Staff, Seattle City Council, to Councilmembers, Seattle City Council 1 (Feb. 1, 2013),
http://clerk.seattle.gov/~public/meetingrecords/2013/pscrt20130206_3a.pdf [http://perma.cc/2Q8BUHJT].
44. Id.
45. SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 122886 (2008), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~archives/Ordinances/
Ord_122886.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3KM-QUM6] (approving receipt of fiscal year 2008 UASI
funds); Memorandum from John Diaz, supra note 39, at 1 (stating that drones were purchased with
funds authorized pursuant to Ordinance 122886).
46. See Jennifer Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG
(Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you [http://perma.cc/
RJP3-MD2F]. Lynch filed many of the public records act requests discussed in this Article,
demonstrating the ability of one person making good strategic use of open records laws to bring
meaningful increased transparency to a policy arena.
47. See Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Lists of Drone Certificates—Many Questions Left
FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG
(Apr.
19,
2012),
Unanswered,
ELEC. FRONTIER
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/faa-releases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-manyquestions-unanswered [http://perma.cc/YVC5-DHUD]; FAA LIST OF CERTIFICATES OF
AUTHORIZATIONS (COAS), ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/20120416
_faa_drones_coa_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/8V9S-8P52].
48. See, e.g., Christine Clarridge, Eye-in-Sky SPD Drones Stir Privacy Concerns, SEATTLE TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2012, 10:05 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/eye-in-sky-spd-drones-stirprivacy-concerns/ [http://perma.cc/699P-NHNM]; Somini Sengupta, Lawmakers Set Limits on
Police in Using Drones, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2013, at A1. Interestingly, this was not the first time
the media had covered acquisition of the drones, but prior stories appear to have gone unnoticed.
According to the city council testimony of Assistant Chief Paul McDonagh, the police department
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of Washington did not condemn acquisition of the drone, but did call for
regulations for its use. 49 Seattle’s leading newspaper called for “formal
oversight” of the drone to prevent encroachments on civil liberties.50
The Seattle Police Department defended its acquisition of the drone. 51
The police chief downplayed any policy implications, describing the
drone as “merely an expansion of the daily task of patrol officers to
collect all information necessary to safely and effectively respond to
calls for service and accomplish law enforcement goals.” 52 The police
chief agreed to develop a policy for permissible uses for the drone, but
made no mention of running the policy by the city council. 53
Some city council members expressed exasperation that they had not
been told about the drone in advance. 54 They were also frustrated by the
police department’s failure to identify a role for the city council in
approving a use policy, which prompted one council member to suggest
that police “have more of a dialogue with the council, because we are the
ones that . . . approve funding decisions and we want to make
sure . . . that you are hearing everything that we hear as well.” 55 This
was a reminder that the city council controls the police department’s
overall budget and can choose to approve or disapprove purchases on an
item-by-item basis. It was also an implicit suggestion that it would be

had done two pieces on the drones about a year prior. Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil
Rights and Technology Committee, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 38:55 (May 2, 2012)
http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-council/20122013-public-safety-civil-rightsand-technology-committee/?videoid=x23397 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of Assistant
Chief Paul McDonagh); see, e.g., Johnathon Fitzpatrick, Did You Know Seattle Police Have a
Flying Surveillance Drone?, SEATTLE WKLY. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.seattleweekly.com/home/
936836-129/technology [https://perma.cc/6SQ6-TZ46 ] (one of the earlier stories on the drones).
49. Clarridge, supra note 48.
50. Aerial Drones Are Law-Enforcement Tools That Need Formal Oversight, SEATTLE TIMES
(May 6, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2018143433_edit07drone.html [https://perma.
cc/95U2-JSJ4].
51. Memorandum from John Diaz, supra note 39.
52. Id. at 4.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Thompson, supra note 39. As councilmember Mike O’Brien put it,
when we have cameras flying around and significant costs and I think to some eyes, is it a toy
or is it a useful tool is a question that we’re always considering, I think we’re in a little bit of a
tough place and I think the best thing is to bring us along and to make sure we’re working
really closely with partners, especially anything with a camera in it to get to a place where
we’re going to all be comfortable with it.
Seattle City Council, supra note 48, at 58:00 (statement of Mike O’Brien, Vice Chair, Public Safety,
Civil Rights and Technology Committee).
55. Seattle City Council, supra note 48, at 55:00 (statement of Bruce Harrell, Chair, Public
Safety, Civil Rights and Technology).
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wise for the police department to cooperate with the city council by
involving it in key decisions.
The police department mounted a public relations campaign to
convince the public of the good the drone would do, but it was too little,
too late. The local ACLU affiliate was willing to go along with a regime
that involved the regulated use of drones, but others outflanked it by
demanding that the police get rid of the drone. When the police hosted
an open house to display the drone and answer questions, members of
the public hurled insults at them. 56 The police department also invited
the public to contribute to a draft policy for the use of drones. 57 After
some members of the public asserted that a use policy was inadequate
because the police department would be free to amend it at any time, 58 a
council member proposed a draft ordinance setting legally binding limits
on police use of drones. 59 The city council hearing at which the
ordinance was first discussed likewise drew heated public opposition to
the idea of using drones at all. 60 In addition, some objected to the
process, driven by the availability of federal funds, which led to the
drone’s acquisition. 61

56. See Christine Clarridge, Police Display Drones They Hope to Deploy, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct.
24, 2012, 10:29 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/seattle-police-display-drones-theyhope-to-deploy/ [https://perma.cc/8VS4-SGFX]; Christine Clarridge, Protesters Steal the Show at
Seattle Police Gathering to Explain Intended Use of Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct 25, 2012, 10:54
PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/protesters-steal-the-show-at-seattle-police-gathering
-to-explain-intended-use-of-drones/ [https://perma.cc/LP6N-JS2Z]; Jake Ellison, Drones Get Really
Tiny; New Rules Proposed for Seattle Police, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, (Feb. 6, 2013, 3:48
PM)
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Drones-get-really-tiny-Seattle-council-may-make4250452.php [https://perma.cc/D7HD-C9UW]; Brendan Kiley, Last Night’s Police Drone
“Demonstration” Turned into Another Kind of Demonstration, THE STRANGER: SLOG (Oct. 26,
2012, 10:17 AM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2012/10/26/last-nights-police-dronedemonstration-turned-into-another-kind-of-demonstration [https://perma.cc/A4PC-J5JU].
57. Clarridge, Protesters Steal the Show at Seattle Police Gathering to Explain Intended Use of
Drones, supra note 56.
58. Christine Clarridge, Use of Police Drones by Seattle Police Strikes a Nerve, SEATTLE TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2012, 6:34 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/use-of-drones-by-seattle-policestrikes-a-nerve/ [https://perma.cc/8SMN-4DUZ].
59. Jake Ellison, supra note 56.
60. Christine Clarridge, Heated Hearing Airs Distrust over SPD Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 7,
2013, 3:03 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/heated-hearing-airs-distrust-over-spddrones/ [https://perma.cc/Z2AW-95EB].
61. As Jennifer Shaw, Deputy Director of the Washington State American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) put it,
[w]e really are concerned that our police department has jumped on this bandwagon that other
departments across the country have jumped on, which is to follow federal money instead of
having the city leaders, the elected officials, and the civilian leaders, be the ones to decide the
directions and the use of the technology that comes into the department.
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Despite efforts by the police department and some city council
members to save the drone, the mayor stepped in and terminated the
program. He explained that it had become a distraction from more
pressing law enforcement priorities. 62 In 2014, Seattle donated the drone
to Los Angeles, 63 where it also provoked such strenuous public
opposition that it was never flown. 64
The drone was one of two surveillance controversies in Seattle that
unfolded in quick succession. Around the same time, members of the
public began to express dismay over a second issue: the deployment of a
mesh network with surveillance cameras in waterfront neighborhoods. 65
In 2011, the DHS awarded Seattle nearly five million dollars to
deploy a mesh network. 66 The funds came from the Port Security Grant
Program, which, as the name suggests, works to improve security at
vulnerable ports. 67 The network had many potential capabilities. It
would allow first responders to communicate even if the cellular
telephone network was unavailable or overloaded (a well-known
problem that occurred in New York City on 9/11). 68 It would also enable
Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Committee, SEATTLE CHANNEL, at
2:20 (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/city-council/20122013public-safety-civil-rights-and-technology-committee/?videoid=x22317 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016)
(statement of Jennifer Shaw, Deputy Director of the Washington state ACLU). The Seattle Times
editorialized along similar lines, stating that “[i]t was simply bad timing to acquire the drones ahead
of having established operating procedures and requirements for rigorous performance reviews.”
Editorial, Seattle Mayor McGinn Right to Ground Drones, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.seattletimes.com/opinion/editorial-seattle-mayor-mcginn-right-to-ground-drones/
[http://perma.cc/KV22-F2NZ]; see also Danny Westneat, Spy Gear Needs Public Scrutiny First,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 9, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/spy-gear-needspublic-scrutiny-first/ [https://perma.cc/KV22-F2NZ].
62. Clarridge, supra note 30 (“The announcement [to end the drone program] came one day after
the city held a public hearing on a proposed ordinance outlining restrictions for the . . . program,
which drew vocal opposition from numerous citizens concerned with intrusions into their
privacy.”).
63. Steve Gorman, Los Angeles Police Try to Reassure Public on Newly Acquired Drones,
REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2014, 6:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/16/us-usa-dronescalifornia-idUSKBN0HB2NC20140916 [https://perma.cc/VF7C-69S3].
64. Shawn Musgrave, LAPD *Still* Doesn’t Know What to Do With Its Drones, MUCKROCK
(Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2015/oct/01/lapd-drones-still-shelf-yearlater/ [https://perma.cc/2X75-RXR2].
65. See Clarridge, supra note 28; Christine Clarridge, Police Get the Picture on Seattle’s SpyCamera Qualms, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 20, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattlenews/police-get-the-picture-on-seattlersquos-spy-camera-qualms/ [https://perma.cc/KW9K-9UHL].
66. Clarridge, Police Get the Picture on Seattle’s Spy-Camera Qualms, supra note 65.
67. See supra Part I.
68. See SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF SEATTLE PORT SECURITY MESH NETWORK 1
(2015), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~public/meetingrecords/2013/pscrt20130220_1b.pdf [http://perma.
cc/J87B-8ZSL].
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police to stream video back from their patrol cars to a central monitoring
station. 69 And, fatefully, it would facilitate the deployment of thirty
surveillance cameras in public places. 70
In May 2012, the police department sought and obtained the
unanimous approval of the city council to accept the DHS money and
begin construction of the network. 71 Unfortunately, the police
department’s depiction of the camera network was deeply misleading.
The department created the strong impression that the cameras would
focus solely on port facilities and the shoreline—in other words,
selected, sensitive commercial buildings and the coast—and did not
mention that they would also be used for surveillance of people in
residential neighborhoods. 72 Written materials described only “strategic
placement of video cameras monitoring port facilities, ferry terminals,
and coast lines within the City’s limits.” 73 Chris Steel, the police
department’s grant manager, testified that the cameras would “basically
keep an eye on the port facilities within the Port of Seattle region.” 74
Assistant Chief Paul McDonagh added that, “[t]he idea here was to
strategically place cameras, video cameras, around the waterfront area
that monitor the shoreline and the waterway.” 75
The department’s statements turned out to be true but incomplete. The
department also placed cameras in parts of downtown where a
substantial number of people lived, but where there were no port
facilities to protect. Even some of the department’s strongest supporters
on the council felt blindsided by this revelation. One such ally, public
safety committee chair Bruce Harrell, said,
moving forward on any kind of camera surveillance
technology . . . , it’s not a twenty questions game, did you ask
69. Matt A. Fikse, Seattle’s New Waterfront Cameras: The Beginning of City-Wide
Surveillance?, CROSSCUT (Mar. 13, 2013), http://crosscut.com/2013/03/crosscut-investigatesquestions-spd-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/LGW7-69YM].
70. Id.
WASH.,
ORDINANCE
123879
(May
7,
2012),
71. Id.;
SEATTLE,
http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/~archives/Ordinances/Ord_123879.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9JXB-E8M4]
(approving receipt of funds from U.S. Department of Homeland Security Port Security Grant
Program).
72. Letter from Michael McGinn, Mayor, City of Seattle, to Sally J. Clark, President, Seattle City
Council (Mar. 13, 2012), http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/~archives/Ordinances/Ord_123879.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KR68-MXUN].
73. Id.
74. Seattle City Council, supra note 48, at 1:17:00 (statement of Chris Steel, Grant Manager,
Seattle Police Department).
75. Id. at 1:21:00 (statement of Paul McDonagh, East Precinct Commander, Seattle Police
Department).
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the right questions . . . . I just expect the department . . . to have
a heightened sensitivity toward camera issues such that I would
have liked to have had this conversation when the grants were
approved. 76
In February 2013, the mayor stated that he did not want the not-yetactivated mesh network turned on until there was more public
discussion. 77 The coup de grâce for the mesh network came when the
media reported on yet another undisclosed capability: it could track the
location of anyone carrying a wi-fi-enabled device. 78 This tracking was
too much coming on the heels of the camera controversy: the mesh
network was dead. In March 2014, the newly elected mayor, Ed Murray,
commented that he did not expect the network to be activated for a long
time, if ever. He further remarked: “This city, it appears, when
opportunities arise to get money from the feds, we go after the money,
maybe without thinking through whether we actually want this kind of
equipment in our city.” 79
Given the cascade of surveillance controversies, some members of the
city council concluded that the police department’s lack of transparency
was a systemic problem. 80 This led the council to adopt an innovative
solution: the nation’s first-ever local ordinance requiring city
departments to seek approval prior to acquiring any surveillance
equipment.
76. Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Committee, SEATTLE
CHANNEL, at 1:11:00 (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-and-council/citycouncil/20122013-public-safety-civil-rights-and-technology-committee/?videoid=x22257
(last
visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of Bruce Harrell, Chair, Public Safety, Civil Rights and
Technology).
77. Jon Humbert, City Leaders Raising Questions About Seattle Surveillance Plan, KOMO NEWS
(Feb. 14. 2013), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/City-leaders-raising-questions-aboutSeattle-surveillance-plan-191352151.html [https://perma.cc/VW6F-WRGY].
78. See David Ham, Seattle Police Have a Wireless Network That Can Track Your Every Move,
KIROTV (Nov. 7, 2013, 8:09 PM), http://www.kiro7.com/news/seattle-police-have-wirelessnetwork-can-track-you/246051198 [https://perma.cc/ZSB7-72EH]
(“Every time a device looks for a Wi-Fi signal and the access point recognizes it, it can store that
data.”).
79. Mayor Murray Re: SPD Surveillance Cams, WEST SEATTLE BLOG, at 01:01 (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://westseattleblog.com/2014/03/wsb-qa-with-the-mayor-2-will-spds-surveillance-cameras-everbe-turned-on/ [https://perma.cc/SD2Q-QFBV].
80. See, e.g., Seattle City Council, Public Safety, Civil Rights and Technology Committee,
SEATTLE CHANNEL, at 1:48:00 (Mar. 6, 2013), http://www.seattlechannel.org/mayor-andcouncil/city-council/city-council-all-videos-index?videoid=x22186 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016)
(statement of Council President Sally J. Clark); SEATTLE, WASH., ORDINANCE 124142 (2013)
(“WHEREAS, recent incidents involving the City’s acquisition of drones and the installation of
video cameras along Seattle’s waterfront and downtown have raised concerns over privacy and the
lack of public process leading up to the decisions to use certain surveillance equipment . . . .”).
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The ordinance, which passed unanimously, provides for democratic
oversight and greater transparency. It obligates any department wishing
to acquire surveillance equipment to “obtain City Council approval via
ordinance prior to acquisition.” 81 It also forbids city departments from
installing or deploying such equipment until the council approves an
operational protocol governing its use. 82 The operational protocol must
specify how the equipment will be used and where it will be located. It
must provide a description of how the equipment will impact privacy
and anonymity and how the department will mitigate any risks to
privacy and anonymity. Further, it must specify how and when data will
be retained and who will be able to access the data and must contain a
plan for reaching out to members of the public in communities where
surveillance equipment will be located.83 In addition to this operational
protocol, the ordinance obligates the police to submit for approval a
separate data management protocol relating to the surveillance
equipment in question, addressing the collection, use, retention, and
sharing of data it gathers. 84
Although comprehensive in its requirements, the ordinance’s
definition of “surveillance equipment” contains exceptions that limit the
scope of its application. The effect of these exceptions is unclear but
could be significant. Most notably, the ordinance exempts police from
the requirement to obtain council approval before acquiring surveillance
equipment that it uses “on a temporary basis for the purpose of a
criminal investigation supported by reasonable suspicion[.]” 85 This
exemption could cover a vast amount of surveillance activity. If, for
example, police temporarily installed an automatic license plate reader to
register all cars coming in and out of a particular parking lot because
they had reasonable suspicion that prostitution was taking place on the
premises, this use would appear to be exempt.
The Seattle surveillance ordinance is now more than two years old,
and the police department has not returned to the council regarding any
technology acquisition. It is difficult to know what to make of this
outcome. Did the negative public and political response, which included
the ordinance itself, and the prospect of constraints imposed by the
required protocols lead the police department to avoid the acquisition of

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 14.18.20 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 14.18.30.
Id. § 14.18.40.
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new surveillance technology requiring council approval? If so, does that
mean surveillance practices have been effectively constrained by the
ordinance? Or have authorities found they could satisfy their wish to
obtain additional surveillance using the ordinance’s exceptions?
Doug Klunder, Privacy Counsel at the Washington ACLU affiliate,
believes that the ordinance has forestalled the deployment of
surveillance technology:
The ordinance has had real value. It is much more likely that the
mesh network would be up and running now without the
ordinance. Drafting a vague privacy policy after a quiet period
of a year or two might well have been enough to overcome
public opposition to the mesh network. The ordinance’s
requirement of development of detailed protocols, along with
council approval, is a greater obstacle that the police department
seems unwilling to tackle. 86
Klunder also believes that the ordinance, coupled with the
experiences with the drone and the mesh network, achieved something
of a cultural shift within the police department. When the Seattle Police
Department wanted to roll out limited facial recognition capabilities, it
brought local privacy activists into the conversation at the outset and
also obtained city council approval, even though facial recognition was
not covered by the terms of the ordinance (because it is a piece of
software, not “equipment,” as the ordinance defines it).87
3.

Analysis of Surveillance Policy Making in Seattle

The collapse of Seattle’s drone and mesh network surveillance
initiatives seems to have been the result of the Seattle Police
Department’s persistent and ultimately self-defeating inability (or
unwillingness) to bring councilmembers and the public into the decisionmaking process at an early stage. Once the technologies (or the full
extent of their capabilities) were discovered, the public was so upset by
the department’s secrecy that it proved impossible to have a reasonable
conversation about the underlying merits of the technology. Federal
public spending programs contributed to the police department’s
mishandling of public relations by enabling the department to acquire
the technologies without obtaining public support. The programs also
enabled the police department to acquire the technologies without
86. Statement of Doug Klunder, Privacy Counsel, ACLU of Washington (June 25, 2015) (on file
with author).
87. Id.
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addressing their impact on civil rights and liberties. When the
acquisitions became public, these issues had to be addressed, but it was
too late to address them in a reasonable manner.
The Seattle case study also illustrates how the national security
objectives that drive the federal programs are largely irrelevant at the
local level. The federal government’s purpose in expending funds
through its Urban Areas Security Initiative and Port Security Grant
Program was to combat terrorism. This purpose was lost in the debate in
Seattle. Instead, residents and council members focused on the
immediate and tangible effects of the surveillance equipment acquired
under these programs on day-to-day policing. This outcome is not
surprising. Surveillance equipment is inherently dual-purpose
equipment, and terrorism is a relatively small proportion of overall
crime.
Finally, the Seattle case study offers a partial path forward in the
council’s surveillance equipment ordinance. The ordinance ensures early
public disclosure and an opportunity for public debate. But this solves
only the problem of nondisclosure. The city council and the public must
be able to grasp the implications of what they are being told. Our next
case study, Oakland, shows that this can be a problem.
B.

Oakland Acquires a Domain Awareness Center

In 2010, the Oakland City Council granted its police and fire
departments approval to build a Domain Awareness Center (DAC),
using federal funds from the Port Security Grant Program, to enhance
security at Oakland’s port. The DAC aggregated surveillance data
already being gathered in all corners of the city into a single facility for
monitoring and analysis. The theory behind this data aggregation was
that it would improve the ability of port officials to anticipate threats to
the port while also enhancing the capabilities of Oakland’s police and
fire departments to detect crime and respond to emergencies.
The council unanimously approved the DAC, and no members of the
public objected. It was not to stay that way. In 2013, police and fire
representatives (whom I refer to as “city staff”) returned to the city
council to request approval to accept another infusion of federal funds to
increase the DAC’s capacity, primarily by integrating additional data
sources. This time, the community response was swift and
overwhelmingly negative. Given Oakland’s decades-long history of poor
community-police relations, the DAC’s capabilities far outstripped
anything the public was willing to entrust to its police department.
The opposition prompted the city council to pass a resolution limiting
the geographic scope of the DAC’s surveillance to the immediate port
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area and then to convene a citizen task force to draft a privacy policy for
the DAC. A dedicated collection of residents met dozens of times in
meetings open to the public. They worked collaboratively with city staff
and crafted a privacy policy acceptable to everyone. The process was so
successful that the policy passed the city council unanimously, and the
council also created a standing citizen privacy committee to draft a
Seattle-style surveillance equipment ordinance to apply to all
government surveillance technology citywide.
If Seattle demonstrated how a police department could sabotage its
surveillance initiatives by provoking public anger through excessive
secrecy, then Oakland illustrates both the limits and promise of greater
involvement of local elected officials and members of the public.
Oakland city staff did voluntarily what Seattle officials are now
compelled by ordinance to do: they came early to the city council and
were forthcoming with details about their surveillance initiative. Yet
neither council members nor the general public grasped the significance
of what they were being told. Once the DAC did become politically
salient, however, the process by which Oakland devised a privacy policy
was a model of inclusiveness and collaboration. It resulted in a privacy
policy that allowed the DAC to go forward and still reflected the
community’s strongly expressed political preferences.
1.

History of Police-Community Relations in Oakland

It is difficult to understand Oakland’s reaction to the DAC without at
least some understanding of the history of police-community relations in
Oakland. It is not possible to more than gesture at this history in the
space available in this Article. 88 For present purposes, suffice it to say
that the people of Oakland have a long and troubled relationship with
their police force. The Black Panthers got their start organizing armed
citizens’ patrols to monitor police officers in Oakland 89 and became one
of the FBI’s main targets in its notorious COINTELPRO surveillance
investigations. COINTELPRO, or “Counterintelligence Program,” was
an FBI initiative that surveilled and disrupted domestic political and
social groups. Eventually, Congress condemned the program and the

88. There does not appear to be a single, definitive treatment of policing in Oakland. However,
for a work that addresses policing in Oakland within the context of broader social and political
questions, see ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR
OAKLAND (2003).
89. Steve Wasserman, Rage and Ruin: On the Black Panthers, THE NATION (June 5, 2013),
http://www.thenation.com/article/rage-and-ruin-black-panthers/ [https://perma.cc/3BKF-CNYP].
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FBI repudiated it. 90 Politically involved people in Oakland, particularly
older people, still evoke COINTELPRO when arguing for limits on
surveillance and on the authority of the police more generally. 91
If Oakland’s status as home of the Panthers provides a historical
backdrop, a more recent example of systematic police abuse further
shapes citizen-police relationships. In 2000, rookie police officer Keith
Batt resigned after just ten days on the force. He did so to blow the
whistle on the conduct of four officers, known as the Riders, who were
assaulting, planting evidence on, and arresting innocent people in West
Oakland—at that time a mostly black community. 92
Investigations substantiated Batt’s allegations. Although criminal
prosecutions of the accused officers was unsuccessful, the police
department fired the Riders, and a civil suit based on the officers’ abuse
yielded a $10.9 million settlement for 119 people. 93 More importantly,
the settlement compelled the city to agree to implement a list of fifty-one
reforms. 94
Nearly a decade later, the city had failed to implement a substantial
number of these mandated reforms. 95 In 2012, U.S. District Court Judge
Thelton Henderson, frustrated with the non-compliance, threatened to
put the entire department under federal receivership and ultimately

90. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, COINTELPRO, FBI RECORDS: THE VAULT,
https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro [https://perma.cc/3MPU-9TDM] (“COINTELPRO was later
rightfully criticized by Congress and the American people for abridging first amendment rights and
for other reasons.”).
91. See, e.g., Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency & City Council, CITY
OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 03:41 (Mar. 4, 2014), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=2&clip_id=1462 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (public commenter invoking the Panthers and
COINTELPRO).
92. Glenn Chapman, Prosecutor Gives Up ‘Riders’ Case, EAST BAY TIMES (June 3, 2005),
http://www.insidebayarea.com/dailyreview/localnews/ci_2777760
[https://perma.cc/LW8DB5MA]; Jim Herron Zamora, Spotlight on Police as ‘Riders’ Go on Trial, S.F. GATE (Apr. 29,
2002), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Spotlight-on-police-as-Riders-go-on-trial-2844728.
php [https://perma.cc/NES2-LHFD] (“Two years after a band of Oakland police officers known as
the ‘Riders’ allegedly arrested and roughed up innocent citizens in the biggest scandal to hit the
department in decades, three of the officers are scheduled to go on trial today as the case ripples
through the city.”).
93. D.A. Is Right to Seek Retrial of ‘Riders’ Case, THE ARGUS (Nov. 19, 2003); Chip Johnson,
Prosecution Fumbled on Riders’ Case / Witnesses Couldn’t Win Credibility, S.F. GATE (Oct. 6,
2003, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/johnson/article/Prosecution-fumbled-on-Riderscase-Witnesses-2554318.php [https://perma.cc/5H9J-DMCJ].
94. Matthew Artz, Oakland Makes Case Against OPD Takeover, EAST BAY TIMES (Nov. 9,
2012), http://www.insidebayarea.com/oakland-tribune/ci_21965506/oakland-makes-case-againstopd-takeover [https://perma.cc/5LYC-SD64].
95. Id.
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approved the appointment of a court-supervised compliance director to
force progress. 96 The compliance director continues his work to this day.
Although shootings of civilians by Oakland police have dropped
substantially in recent years, as have civil rights lawsuits against the city,
the department is still riven by scandal. 97 Two years before the DAC
controversy broke out, Oakland was the home of a major spin-off of the
Occupy Wall Street movement. 98 Occupy Oakland participants
repeatedly established encampments at various places in Oakland, which
the police were then called upon to clear out. 99 Participants leveled
charges of excessive use of force against police officers. 100 While most
protesters were peaceful, a small share committed property damage and
threw objects at police officers. 101 In a more recent and particularly
shocking scandal, over a dozen officers are currently being investigated
in connection with allegations that they had sex with a teenage
prostitute, who may have been a minor at the outset of some of the
sexual relationships. 102
2.

The Controversy over the Domain Awareness Center

Oakland’s work on the DAC can be traced back at least to 2009. Just
three days before the submission deadline for that year’s federal Port
Security Grant Program, city staff submitted an informational
memorandum to the city council about their collaboration with the Port
of Oakland on a grant application. 103 The city does not appear to have
thought of the idea of creating a DAC itself. Rather, it seems to have

96. Demian Bulwa & Carolyn Jones, Oakland Cuts Deal on Cops, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 6, 2012, at
A1; Dan Levine, For Police Reformers, California City Shows a Rough Road, REUTERS (Dec. 14,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police-oakland-insight-idUSKBN0JS0HL20141214
[https://perma.cc/WP5G-9H5W].
97. Levine, supra note 96.
98. Occupy Oakland, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupy_Oakland [https://perma.
cc/TC8Z-ZTLM].
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also Matthai Kuruvila, Justin Berton & Demian Bulwa, Police Tear Gas Occupy
Oakland Protesters, S.F. GATE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Police-teargas-Occupy-Oakland-protesters-2325544.php#photo-1830498 [https://perma.cc/6KMV-5HPZ].
101. Id.
102. Thomas Fuller, A Young Prostitute, Police Scandals and a Rocky Renaissance in Oakland,
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/us/a-young-prostitute-policescandals-and-a-rocky-renaissance-in-oakland.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4PHK-EV4F].
103. Memorandum from Dan Lindheim, City Adm’r, City of Oakland, to Pub. Safety Comm.,
City of Oakland, 1–2 (June 23, 2009), http://clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/22406.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WNH2-DAEL].
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been a response to the decision of federal grant administrators to
prioritize funding projects that “reflect ‘robust regional coordination’
and an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional security
strategy integration.” 104
The grant proposed creating a DAC “to consolidate a network of
existing surveillance and security sensor technologies and data to
actively monitor critical Port facilities, utility infrastructure, roadways,
and ultimately establish a citywide system.” 105 City staff emphasized that
“[t]he combination of a maritime monitoring and coordination center
with the City of Oakland’s [existing] inter-agency, landside monitoring
and coordination center, [the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)]
could have great potential and benefits in protecting people and critical
infrastructure in both the City and the Port area.”106 City staff also
envisaged the possibility that information sharing might eventually be
regional in scope: “[T]he Center would provide functionality and a
location where multiple agencies can access integrated regional
capabilities and technologies including sensors, platforms,
communications and information exploitation.” 107
The DAC, on its own, would not collect additional data. Rather, it
was to be a data integration center, networking together the city’s
existing surveillance infrastructure. There are a couple of reasons why a
city might want to do this. First, it makes the data the city is collecting
more useful (although potentially more privacy-invasive). For example,
it would enable police officers, within the confines of a single program,
to look both at feeds from video cameras and data collected by license
plate readers. As a result, if a police officer noticed suspicious activity
while monitoring a surveillance camera feed, he or she could easily
check plate-reader data to see who had driven through the area recently.
This is more efficient than the status quo, in which camera footage is
viewed and stored in one program and plate-reader data is viewed and
stored in a separate program. Second, integrating data into one center,
with a common format, makes it easier to share that data with others in
the region and beyond who might have need for it, and perhaps
reciprocally to obtain surveillance data from others. 108
104. Id. at 2.
105. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 4 (emphasis in original).
107. Id.
108. How one feels about data integration probably depends on how one feels about surveillance
in general. If one is of the view that the government is engaged in too much surveillance, then the
barrier to surveillance posed by having to separately access, for example, surveillance camera feeds
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In July 2010, city staff came before the council’s public safety
committee to request authorization to accept $2.9 million in federal
funds. 109 No city council member asked a question, and no members of
the public sought to comment. The committee unanimously granted the
staff’s request. 110 The entire process took less than two minutes. The
request then went to the full city council, where it was one of sixty-five
items on the consent calendar, a special list of non-controversial items
that could be approved as a group through one vote rather than discussed
and voted on individually. Neither members of the council nor the public
commented on the issue. 111 The press also took no notice of this
development.
The city and port worked on constructing the DAC for about three
years. City staff integrated port and city surveillance cameras, the port’s
intrusion detection system, the city’s gunshot detection technology, and
mapping software 112 into the DAC. 113 In 2013, the project returned to the
city council’s docket because city staff needed council authorization to
accept a second round of federal funds. 114 This time, city staff sought to
accept up to two million dollars in additional port security grant funds to
build out the DAC’s capacity, primarily by incorporating additional data
sources. 115 In its report to the council, the DAC team listed “City School
Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System” and California Department
of Transportation cameras as data sources to add, as well as unspecified
“[s]urveillance enhancements for City of Oakland historically high crime
and license plate reader records can be viewed positively. An officer would need to be highly
motivated to go through the effort of gathering data across systems. If, on the other hand, one does
not object to data collection, then the idea of making the data more easily accessible, and easier to
analyze and share, can be considered a net benefit.
109. Special Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 00:29 (July 13, 2010),
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=706 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016)
(statement of Renee Domingo, City of Oakland Director of Emergency Services and Homeland
Security).
110. Id. at 3:00.
111. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency/City Council, CITY OF
OAKLAND, CAL., at 01:23 (July 20, 2010), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_
id=2&clip_id=712 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
112. As the name suggests, this is software that provides a detailed map of the city.
113. CITY & PORT OF OAKLAND, JOINT DOMAIN AWARENESS CENTER, PHASE 2 CONTRACT
AWARD RECOMMENDATION AND STAFF REPORT, at slide 7 (Jan. 28, 2014),
https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=2867275&GUID=02B29757-4333-419B-9403ED47610DEF90 [https://perma.cc/ZH8L-KQDP].
114. Oakland City Council, Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 2 (July 9,
2013), https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=253930&GUID=F28C607C-1680-4BED
-A9C6-49AD169D1B01 [https://perma.cc/BHV2-KRLH].
115. Id.
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areas.” 116 City staff also floated the possibility of integrating private
surveillance cameras into the DAC.
The matter of whether to accept the second round of federal funding
was first referred to the council’s public safety committee. Council
member Dan Kalb asked about the DAC’s integration of video cameras,
and where those cameras would be located: “First of all, this is all on
port property, including airport, all the port property, right? It’s not the
rest of the city.” 117 Renee Domingo, the city’s emergency manager,
responded, “It will also integrate any existing cameras the city has.”118
Kalb followed up, “But on or adjacent to port property, not, like, four
miles away from the port or anything, it’s all that general area, is that
right?” Domingo did not provide a direct answer to this question. 119
Kalb moved onto other topics, but then circled back to ask, “I assume
none of these cameras go into people’s living rooms or anything like
that?” 120 Domingo replied that they did not. 121 The public safety
committee then unanimously approved accepting the funding, resulting
in the matter advancing to the full city council. 122
The exchange between Kalb and Domingo did not go unnoticed by
members of the public. When the full city council met the following
week, and the question of accepting a second infusion of federal money
came up on the consent calendar, the sailing was not so smooth. 123
About a dozen individuals spoke against the DAC during the public
comment period and none spoke in support. Many speakers were
concerned about the paucity of available information on what would be
done with data gathered in the DAC. The following is a representative
comment:

116. Agenda Report Memorandum from Teresa Delach Reed, Fire Chief, City of Oakland, to
Deanna J. Santana, City Adm’r, City of Oakland 5 (June 23, 2013), https://oakland.
legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=2554079&GUID=BFC8C979-8FA8-4B7E-B8ED-6C0F54A
60FFC [http://perma.cc/K9F3-JKKE].
117. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 00:27 (July 9, 2013),
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1315 (last visited Dec. 17,
2016).
118. Id. at 00:28.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 00:30.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 00:31.
123. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council, CITY
OF OAKLAND, CAL., (July 16, 2013), https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=A&ID=254282&
GUID=902659F8-00DA-45CB-8368-C86C2D45CCFA [https://perma.cc/PY4J-EU4X].
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We don’t know how long this data is going to be collected, we
don’t know what other agencies it’s going to be shared with, we
don’t know, you know, they were talking about having access to
it on mobile devices by OPD. Any officer? Only a limited
number of people? There are so many unanswered questions that
you really should put a stop to this until you have some actual
oversight. 124
Members of the council took these concerns to heart and decided to
postpone action on the item until its next meeting. 125 By the time the
issue again arose two weeks later, the DAC had become the object of
significant national press attention. At the local level, it was sufficiently
controversial to prompt fifty members of the public to show up to
express their views. 126
It is difficult to say with certainty why the DAC, which provoked no
objection in 2010, proved so controversial in 2013. However, by 2013,
the national political climate had grown considerably more hostile
toward government surveillance. Just weeks before the DAC came
before the council, the media began reporting a series of stories about
the unprecedented scale and scope of the National Security Agency’s
surveillance programs. 127 Reporters based these stories on documents
exfiltrated by government contractor Edward Snowden, whose dramatic
escape to Hong Kong and subsequent flight to Moscow further fueled a
media firestorm. 128 For the first time since 9/11, members of the public
appeared increasingly skeptical of the federal government’s surveillance
initiatives. The DAC, although wholly unrelated to any of the programs
124. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency & City Council, CITY OF
OAKLAND, CAL., at 02:52 (July 16, 2013), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=2&clip_id=1320 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statement of David Colburn).
125. Id. at 03:34.
126. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., SPECIAL CONCURRENT MEETING OF THE OAKLAND
REDEVELOPMENT SUCCESSOR AGENCY / CITY COUNCIL / GEOLOGIC HAZARD ABATEMENT
DISTRICT BOARD, at 35 (July 30, 2013), https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=
258725&GUID=E6ABC786-3DB3-4F03-83C8-1DED575F4AC6 [http://perma.cc/M945-9NCH].
127. See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data From
Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internetcompanies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845d970ccb04497_story.html [https://perma.cc/32BA-YBL3]; Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting
Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order
[https://perma.cc/JM86-PLFT].
128. Tania Branigan & Miriam Elder, Edward Snowden Leaves Hong Kong for Moscow,
GUARDIAN (June 23, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowdenleaves-hong-kong-moscow [http://perma.cc/QTD7-N3HY].
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disclosed by Snowden, nonetheless may have been caught in the
crosshairs.
In response to increasing public concern, the city council imposed
substantial privacy safeguards on the DAC. It limited the data that could
be incorporated into the DAC to city- and port-owned sources, 129 and it
required city staff to develop a privacy and data retention policy for the
DAC. 130 Members of the public were largely unappeased because they
wanted the entire enterprise shut down. However, the council approved
the DAC, probably reflecting the sentiment expressed by council
member (now Mayor) Libby Schaaf:
We have tried our best to find the sweet spot. We are going to
take advantage of the tools that we have at hand to make our city
safe . . . and at the same time try and address the really
legitimate and important concerns that have been raised . . . but
if we do not approve this money tonight, we jeopardize losing
valuable resources that will make the City of Oakland safer. 131
Unfortunately for proponents of the DAC, two key missteps by city
staff provided ammunition for those who felt that Oakland city officials
were either not competent or not trustworthy, and in either case should
not be afforded the increased power for surveillance the DAC would
bring.
First, an investigation by the non-profit Oakland Privacy Working
Group 132 demonstrated that the contractor building the DAC had been
hired in violation of a city prohibition on doing business with entities
involved in nuclear weapons work. 133 This revelation forced city staff to
return to the city council on multiple occasions to secure approval of a
new contractor, 134 with each appearance giving opponents an
opportunity to ramp up their objections. 135
129. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., supra note 126, at 34–35.
130. Id.
131. Special Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency / City Council
/ Geologic Hazard Abatement District Board, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 06:54 (July 30, 2013),
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1330 (last visited Dec. 17,
2016).
132. Matthew Artz, Nuclear Law Again Threatens Oakland Surveillance Hub, CONTRA COSTA
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.contracostatimes.com/news/ci_25019462/nuclear-law-againthreatens-oakland-surveillance-hub [http://perma.cc/UQM6-XHWF].
133. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 03:28 (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1391 (last visited Dec. 17,
2016).
134. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., Meeting Minutes: Public Safety Committee, at 5 (Nov. 12, 2013),
https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=268611&GUID=D7918CB2-FFAE-4FC0AC70-1E34F0EA11D2 [https://perma.cc/E4MQ-2E4S]; CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., Meeting
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By early 2014, the volume of opposition was sufficient to prompt the
city staff to request policy guidance from the council on whether the
project should continue at all and, if so, in what form. At this point the
DAC included 137 port security cameras, the port’s physical intrusion
detection system, the city’s gunshot detection technology, 136 the
mapping program, and forty city traffic cameras. 137 A January hearing
revealed the city staff’s second major error: failure, despite the passage
of eight months, to draft the privacy and data retention policy for the
DAC that the city council had specifically directed them to draft. While
staff then hurriedly put together what they called a draft privacy
framework, city council members were harshly critical. They said that it
should have come out months earlier, and one member characterized it
“not as a draft of a set of policies” but “more like a draft of a draft of a
draft.” 138
Things came to a head at a council meeting in March 2014, by which
time the DAC had generated a truly remarkable amount of opposition.
One hundred forty-nine members of the public submitted requests to
speak at the meeting, and the comments they made were
overwhelmingly negative. They came from a broad cross-section of the
community. Dan Siegel, a prominent Oakland attorney and activist,
specifically invoked the past use of COINTELPRO to attack the
Panthers as a reason to oppose the DAC, as did some other older
Minutes: Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council, at
30 (Nov. 19, 2013), https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=274014&GUID=
40979A84-886E-4AE6-A254-6BE7A4E0197D [https://perma.cc/VU9P-SVXK] [hereinafter Nov.
19 2013 Meeting Minutes].
135. For example, at a November 19, 2013 full-council meeting at which the DAC team returned
to obtain authorization to select a new contractor, sixty-one speakers showed up to provide
comment on the DAC, and nearly all of them expressed negative views. CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL.,
Nov. 19 2013 Meeting Minutes, supra note 134. The council did, however, authorize the DAC team
to seek out a new vendor, with the proviso that the council would need to authorize going forward
with that vendor. Id.
136. Gunshot detection technology is a network of microphones that is designed to detect
gunshots and automatically report them to the police. Will Kane, Oakland Cops Aim to Scrap
Gunfire-Detecting ShotSpotter, S.F. GATE (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/
Oakland-cops-aim-to-scrap-gunfire-detecting-5316060.php [https://perma.cc/N9E4-QJSC].
137. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 1:56 (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1437 (last visited Dec. 17,
2016). The figure forty is striking because the previous summer Domingo had told the council that
the city had only four to five such cameras. It is unclear whether one of the figures was incorrect, or
whether the city installed a substantial number of additional traffic cameras at the same time that
members of the public were increasingly pushing back against the DAC.
138. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Agency/City Council, CITY OF
OAKLAND, CAL., at 4:53 (February 18, 2014), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=2&clip_id=1449 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
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Oakland residents. 139 Individuals who had recently participated in the
Occupy Oakland demonstrations complained that the police
department’s conduct toward demonstrators showed they were
untrustworthy. 140 Most strikingly, perhaps one-third of the public
speakers expressly identified themselves as Muslim and grounded their
opposition to the DAC in more general concerns about the surveillance
of Muslims after 9/11. 141
In the end, a closely divided council voted to restrict the DAC to
monitoring only the port and to remove the forty city traffic cameras
from the DAC along with the portions of its gunshot detection system
not proximate to the port. 142 Further, the council forbade DAC personnel
from sharing data with any local, state, or federal entity without a
memorandum of understanding expressly authorized by the council, and
it prohibited the addition of new “systems or capabilities” without
council approval. 143 It also reiterated the requirement that the council
sign off on a privacy and data retention policy prior to activation of the
DAC and convened a citizen task force to develop this policy. 144 The
DAC henceforth would be structured to focus on the immediate port
area, with a close supervisory structure to ensure that the council would
have to affirmatively approve any expansion of the DAC.
City staff worked to assemble a group of individuals to serve on the
privacy policy task force, including those with expertise in technology
and civil liberties, those from a broad range of Oakland neighborhoods,
and representatives of the business community. 145 The resulting
committee met dozens of times with city staff in meetings open to the
public. 146 It first gathered information about the DAC from city staff and

139. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council, CITY
OAKLAND, CAL., at 3:41 (Mar. 4, 2014), http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?
view_id=2&clip_id=1462 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Concurrent Meeting]
140. Id. at 4:02 (public comment of unnamed, self-identified protest participant).
141. Id. (comments beginning at about 5:02).
142. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency & City Council,
supra note 139 (meeting minutes at 17).
143. Id. at 17–18.
144. Id. at 18.
145. Agenda Report Memorandum from Joe DeVries, Assistant to the City Adm’r, City of
Oakland, to John A. Flores, Interim City Adm’r, City of Oakland 4 (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3479358&GUID=6DD7CFF6-804F-48C6AFDC-6DE72F3E1C3E [perma.cc/TJ8H-AW2Z].
146. See id. (the committee “met 18 times over six months” through January 2015); Agenda
Report Memorandum from Joe DeVries, Assistant to the City Adm’r, City of Oakland, to John A.
Flores, Interim City Administrator, City of Oakland 2 (Apr. 30, 2015),
OF
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formulated core principles to guide its work going forward. It then used
these core principles to develop a draft privacy policy for the DAC.147
The policy dealt with the key questions of data usage, storage, and
dissemination. 148 The policy did so by limiting the DAC’s uses to a
specifically enumerated list (e.g., active shooter, bomb threat,
earthquake); by forbidding the DAC to store data unless relevant to one
of the enumerated uses; and by prohibiting data sharing except pursuant
to court order or a written memorandum of understanding or contract
approved by the city council. 149
This process resulted in the creation of a policy that both city staff
and the community members could support and that ultimately passed
the city council unanimously. 150 Although it is difficult to generalize
about what the public thought, segments of the public that had been
critical of the DAC expressed satisfaction with this outcome. 151
The process was so successful that city staff supported the
committee’s suggestion that a permanent standing privacy advisory
commission be formed to examine privacy in the city as a whole and to
develop a citywide surveillance equipment ordinance. 152 As the city staff
member charged with meeting with the committee put it to the city
council:
This has been a new field for us as far as staff is concerned,
partnering with the community, partnering with privacy
advocates, bringing our first responders and law enforcement to
the table. It’s been a rich dialog and I think it will continue to be
a rich dialog as more technologies are introduced to the
marketplace, and having an ordinance that guides and creates a

https://oakland.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=3728533&GUID=F9217BE0-83E6-479F-B072A370FCFCB846 [http://perma.cc/YXM8-2DWJ] (noting a series of additional meetings in 2015).
147. DAC Draft Privacy Policy Public Comments, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL.,
http://www2.oaklandnet.com/Government/o/CityAdministration/OAK051790
[http://perma.cc/
MTA8-GEWC] (describing the committee’s formation and its development of the privacy policy).
148. See OAKLAND, CAL., RESOLUTION 85,638 (June 2, 2015). The council had dealt with the
threshold issue of what data was to be collected by passing legislation specifying what sources
could be fed into the DAC. See OAKLAND, CAL., RESOLUTION 84,869 (Mar. 4, 2014).
149. OAKLAND, CAL., RESOLUTION 85,638 (June 2, 2015).
150. Concurrent Meeting of the Oakland Redevelopment Successor Agency and the City Council,
CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 8:59:00 (June 2, 2015), http://oakland.granicus.com/
MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1785 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
151. Id. at 9:04:00 (public comment period).
152. Public Safety Committee, CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., at 1:01:45 (May 26, 2015),
http://oakland.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=2&clip_id=1781 (last visited Dec. 17,
2016).
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public process to avoid surprises in the future is good
government. 153
The city council voted in favor of creating a permanent standing
privacy advisory commission as well. 154
3.

Analysis of Surveillance Policy Making in Oakland

While the local police department in Seattle caused the backlash
against its surveillance initiatives by proceeding secretly, in Oakland it
was the elected representatives who misjudged the eventual public
reaction by not understanding the implications of a new technology. The
Oakland case study therefore highlights potential shortcomings of
relying on local elected representatives to set surveillance policy.
Council members have many matters to attend to that place severe
constraints on their ability to devote time to, and develop expertise
about, surveillance policy. Had the council members understood the
technology, they might have avoided the protracted and strident
controversy that unfolded.
As in Seattle, the federal government set the stage for these mistakes
by allocating money for the DAC without requiring that anyone develop
a policy for its use. This left both elected representatives and city staff
scrambling to fill the void once the public and city council members
grasped the DAC’s capabilities.
In Seattle, the debate largely ignored the fact that the technologies
were being promulgated in the name of national security. In Oakland,
the fact that the DAC also served a federal national security purpose was
an additional strike against it. Oakland’s distrust of its police department
may have been enough on its own to kill the DAC, but the Muslim
community’s feeling of being unfairly scrutinized by the federal
government after 9/11 155 and the skepticism generated by Edward
Snowden’s disclosures poisoned the atmosphere still further. 156
Oakland offers another path forward. The most innovative and
successful piece of the Oakland story is the city council’s creation of a
153. Id. at 1:04:00.
154. OAKLAND, CAL., ORDINANCE 13,349 (Jan. 19, 2016), https://oakland.legistar.com/
View.ashx?M=F&ID=4220932&GUID=AA93003C-FE0C-45DB-9F0A-AD0C377D5B5A
[https://perma.cc/4TTH-Q3YD].
155. See Concurrent Meeting, supra note 139, at 5:02.
156. Brian Hofer, How the Fight to Stop Oakland’s Domain Awareness Center Laid the
Groundwork for the Oakland Privacy Commission, ACLU OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA (Sept. 21,
2016),
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/how-fight-stop-oaklands-domain-awareness-center-laidgroundwork-oakland-privacy-commission [https://perma.cc/NHC6-PNCA].
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citizen task force to draft a privacy policy for the DAC. 157 But as
successful as the citizen privacy committee was in Oakland, it is unlikely
to be replicable in very many places. The success of such a committee
depends on a continued high level of interest and day-to-day
involvement by members of the public. Oakland’s strong tradition of
activism (and cadre of dedicated activists willing to spend their evenings
and weekends in city meeting rooms) and high level of concern about
police abuses of power were key ingredients. Not many municipalities
share these features. 158
At the same time, the Oakland experience provides reason to be
skeptical that Seattle-style surveillance equipment ordinances will result
in meaningful oversight or achieve significant public buy-in. From the
start, Oakland city staff did voluntarily much of what Seattle now
mandates. They informed the city council prior to seeking federal
funding 159 and, after they won the grant, presented information about the
DAC to the city council in an open hearing. 160 These steps were not
enough to provoke meaningful engagement by the council or to win the
DAC much-needed political legitimacy. 161
Whatever the differences between Oakland’s and Seattle’s
surveillance controversies, both shared the bedrock feature that a city
council was the ultimate policy-making body. This was not the case in
the next case study, where a regional law enforcement authority received
federal funds for a surveillance initiative, raising a host of additional
transparency and accountability concerns.
C.

San Diego Acquires Facial Recognition Technology

Beginning in 2007, a regional law enforcement authority in the San
Diego area began using federal money to develop and deploy facial
recognition technology. This technology allowed officers to determine
whether individuals they encountered had arrest records simply by
snapping photos of them. The public did not learn of the technology
until 2013, by which time it was well established and widely viewed as a
success. Publicity about the technology in 2013 prompted the regional

157. See Concurrent Meeting, supra note 139.
158. See Jonathan Mahler, Oakland, the Last Refuge of Radical America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/magazine/oakland-occupy-movement.html [https://
perma.cc/3N4T-B5UT].
159. See supra note 103.
160. See supra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
161. Id.
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authority to adopt a fairly sound set of rules regulating the use of the
technology to protect individual privacy.
1.

History of the San Diego Association of Government’s Automated
Regional Justice Information System

In contrast to Oakland and Seattle, the trajectory of San Diego’s
surveillance initiative was divorced from broader questions of
community-police relations. Instead, it was the product of the specific
institution that fostered its development: the Automated Regional Justice
Information System (ARJIS), a law enforcement authority embedded
within a regional planning entity, the San Diego Association of
Governments (SANDAG).
SANDAG coordinates the activities of nineteen local governments in
the greater San Diego area. 162 Its primary focus is on regional planning
issues such as transportation and housing, not law enforcement. Its
visibility is low. Media and advocacy groups do not monitor its activities
regularly, and few members of the public have heard of it. While
SANDAG proceedings are open and offer opportunities for public
comment, virtually no members of the public attend. 163
ARJIS is a sub-entity of SANDAG. 164 Its mandate is “to share
information among justice agencies throughout San Diego and Imperial
Counties.” 165 ARJIS has eighty-two member agencies, including local,
state, and federal law enforcement organizations with operations in the

162. About SANDAG, SANDAG, http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=about.home
[https://perma.cc/4TKN-XE4Y].
163. SANDAG, An Assessment of its Role in the San Diego Region, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S
OFFICE, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2006/sandag/sandag_033006.htm#governance [https://perma.cc
/5ALH-DJ8N] (“Few interest group representatives—and even fewer ordinary residents—attend
SANDAG board meetings. Public comment is limited.”). SANDAG’s governance structure may be
part of the reason why. Members of the public do not elect anyone to SANDAG. See id. Instead,
SANDAG is controlled by a board of directors consisting of people elected to positions in one of
SANDAG’s member governments, who are then appointed to the SANDAG board as an additional
duty. Id. For example, the board’s chair is Ron Roberts, a member of the San Diego Board of
Supervisors. About SANDAG: Board of Directors, SANDAG, http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?
fuseaction=about.board [https://perma.cc/WVQ4-XHVT].
164. ARJIS Governance, AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., http://www.arjis.org/
SitePages/Policies.aspx [https://perma.cc/69ZV-TX8U].
165. See What Is ARJIS?, AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., http://www.arjis.org/
SitePages/WhatIsARJIS.aspx [https://perma.cc/TQJ3-582L]; AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO.
SYS., ARJIS TACIDS: TACTICAL FACIAL RECOGNITION IN THE FIELD, 1–3 (2013),
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LEIM/2013Presentations/2013%20LEIM%20Conference%2
0Workshop%20-%20Technical%20Track%20-%20TACIDS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VTK4-V658]
[hereinafter ARJIS TACIDS].
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area. 166 Many of these agencies contribute both money and the data they
gather to ARJIS, which provides tools to allow law enforcement officers
“to efficiently query various regional, state, and federal data sets for
subject information and case leads.” 167 In addition to facial recognition
technology, ARJIS has created other tools, including a searchable
repository of license plate reader data 168 and access to documentation
regarding millions of police-citizen interactions, from traffic citations to
arrest reports. 169
Because ARJIS is a single-mission agency focused on information
sharing, its structure is designed to facilitate that mission.170 It has a
formal technical working group, which evaluates new technologies prior
to adoption. 171 ARJIS staffs this working group with a mix of end users
(e.g., investigators, patrol officers) and managers to ensure the
technologies are useful to everyone. 172 It also has a business working
group that addresses legal, ethical, and regulatory issues. 173 Both groups
must vet any significant change to an ARJIS system. 174
ARJIS may sound unusual, but it is not an anomaly. It is one of many
regional law enforcement agencies around the country. Researchers have
identified over 250 public safety networks that develop inter-agency
collaborations among public safety organizations at the local, state, and
national levels and suggest that formation of these organizations has
“gained additional impetus in the post 9/11 environment.” 175
166. See ARJIS TACIDS, supra note 165, at 1–3.
167. See BOARD OF DIRECTORS AGENDA, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS (July 11, 2014),
http://www.sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3849_17876.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UA2E7KCK] [hereinafter SANDAG Board Agenda, July 11, 2014] (agenda item no. 14-07-2A, “Public
Safety Program Overview” and Attachment 1).
168. The repository is a searchable database of the times and locations where license plates were
seen. ACLU, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS ARE BEING USED TO
RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 4 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclualprreport-opt-v05.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J27-4N3F].
169. ARJIS TACIDS, supra note 165, at 3.
170. See Michael J. Tyworth, Reflections of Identity: How Information Systems Mirror the
Organization as a Social Actor 128–29 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania
State University) (on file with author).
171. Id. at 94–95.
172. Id. at 130–32.
173. Id. at 95.
174. Id. at 135.
175. Christine B. Williams, et. al, The Formation of Inter-Organizational Information Sharing
Networks in Public Safety: Cartographic Insights on Rational Choice and Institutional
Explanations, 14 INFO. POLITY 13, 15 (2009). In addition to ARJIS, other examples of such entities
operating at the regional level include the San Francisco area’s Bay Area Urban Areas Security
Initiative (UASI), a regional authority with voting representation from the three major cities and
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The history of ARJIS helps explain why it is an especially obscure
component of SANDAG. While ARJIS is now part of SANDAG, that
was not always the case. Established as a regional organization in 1980,
ARJIS was a coalition of law enforcement agencies with a board of
directors staffed with a member of each agency. 176 In 2004, ARJIS was
consolidated into SANDAG to achieve greater administrative
efficiency. 177 The ARJIS board was reconstituted as SANDAG’s
Advisory Committee (generally referred to as the “Public Safety
Committee”), and its membership expanded to include some elected
representatives. 178 However, it was still an outlier among SANDAG’s
committees, where usually only elected representatives are permitted to
vote. At the time of the events described below, the Public Safety
Committee’s voting membership consisted of six elected representatives
and nine law enforcement representatives.179
Even this makes elected representatives look more involved than they
really were. According to an internal SANDAG audit, the Public Safety
Committee’s “primary function is to serve in an advisory capacity.” 180
The real power rested with the Public Safety Committee’s
subcommittee, the Chiefs’/Sheriff’s Management Committee. 181 Every
member of the Chiefs’/Sheriff’s Management Committee, except the
San Diego district attorney, was a law enforcement officer of some
type. 182
some of the counties surrounding San Francisco Bay that allocates federal UASI funds to area
governments. See About the Bay Area UASI, BAY AREA URBAN AREAS SEC. INITIATIVE,
http://www.bayareauasi.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/6FBY-Q79Y]; Programs, BAY AREA
URBAN AREAS SEC. INITIATIVE, http://bayareauasi.org/programs [https://perma.cc/D5E9-GRTC].
The DHS requires that cities and counties take a regional approach to implementation of the UASI
program, which has led to the formation of various regional law enforcement authorities that exist
for the purpose of expending federal UASI funds. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement for
Participating Orlando Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Agencies (July 29, 2010),
http://www.edocs.ci.orlando.fl.us/asv/paperlessagenda.nsf/60f252ae0a55937d852573f50052d808/3
e913aa55b621811852577a600515ebb/$FILE/UASI_FY_2009_MOA_OCSO0001.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/RJS4-EUWE]. Another is the Capital Wireless Information Net (CapWIN), a crossjurisdictional organization of public safety entities in the greater Washington, D.C., area. See About
CapWIN, UNIV. OF MD. A. JAMES CLARK SCH. OF ENG’G, http://www.capwin.org/about
[https://perma.cc/UH3P-B9FN].
176. Tyworth, supra note 167, at 90–92.
177. Id. at 92–93.
178. Id. at 93.
179. SANDAG Board Agenda, July 11, 2014, supra note 167.
180. Tyworth, supra note 167, 93–94.
181. See id. at 94.
182. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, CHIEFS’/SHERIFF’S MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
AGENDA 7 (Apr. 1, 2015), http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_4124_18902.pdf
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The Controversy Over San Diego’s Facial Recognition
Technology

In 2013, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Center for
Investigative Reporting (CIR) jointly revealed that ARJIS had deployed
facial recognition technology. 183 The technology allows officers on
patrol to use a tablet to snap a photo of a person they encounter. 184 It
then compares the photo to a database of photos of individuals who have
been booked in the San Diego area. 185 Within ten to fifteen seconds, 186
the system displays a photo lineup of up to ten possible matches in
ranking order of confidence. 187 If the officer confirms there is a match,
the system automatically queries a variety of additional databases (e.g., a
database of county warrants, DMV data) and returns information
regarding the person’s identity and criminal history. 188 EFF and CIR
reported that twenty-five law enforcement agencies operating in the San
Diego area, including local police departments and federal law
enforcement agencies, were using the system. 189
The widespread availability of facial recognition technology could
transform the ordinary, daily experience of being in public. In the hands
of private citizens, individuals would be able to identify and pull up
[https://perma.cc/A2XG-928A] (attendance sheet for March 4, 2015 meeting listing committee
members and voting statuses).
183. See Jennifer Lynch & Dave Maass, San Diego Gets in Your Face with New Mobile
Identification System, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Nov. 7, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/11/san-diego-gets-your-face-new-mobile-identification-system
[https://perma.cc/R6FF-DB8B]; Ali Winston, Facial Recognition, Once a Battlefield Tool, Lands in
San Diego County, CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Nov. 7, 2013), http://cironline.org/
reports/facial-recognition-once-battlefield-tool-lands-san-diego-county-5502
[https://perma.cc/
JLW9-CLZ2].
184. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183; Winston, supra note 183.
185. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183; Winston, supra note 183.
186. See AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY FOR FACIAL
RECOGNITION 3 (2015), http://www.arjis.org/RegionalPolicies/ARJIS%20Facial%20Recognition
%20AUP%20-%20Approved%20-%20Rev150213.pdf [https://perma.cc/B86U-WN7X] [hereinafter
ARJIS ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY FOR FACIAL RECOGNITION].
187. Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS (Jan. 18,
2013), http://sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=PSC011813 (audio at 0:43:15)
(agenda item no. 7, “Facial Recognition in the Field”) (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (statements of
ARJIS Program Manager Lloyd Muenzer and San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Deputy
Darrin Peralta).
188. AUTOMATED REG’L JUSTICE INFO. SYS., TACIDS: TACTICAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
USING FACIAL RECOGNITION 4 (2013) [hereinafter TACIDS], https://www.eff.org/document/11tacids-final-report-final [https://perma.cc/JGW3-QV27] (final report submitted to U.S. Department
of Justice).
189. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183; Winston, supra note 183.
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public information about strangers in their vicinity, and brick and mortar
stores would be capable of identifying customers as soon as they crossed
the threshold. The impact on law enforcement agents is also potentially
significant; agents would be able to identify those they encountered and
would be able to pull up their criminal histories, warrant information and
threat assessment scores. 190
When ARJIS first deployed facial recognition technology, the use of
this technology was constrained by the way the system was designed
rather than through a written use policy. The system only compares the
images officers take to booking photos, and, if there is a match, officers
have the option to display the subject’s criminal history and any
outstanding arrest warrants. 191 The guideline appears to have been that
officers could deploy the technology on anyone they stopped as well as
anyone who consented. 192
ARJIS’s development of facial recognition stretches back to at least
2007. In that year, the DOJ awarded ARJIS a $418,000 grant through a
program to promote “information-led policing research, technology

190. For example, police in Fresno rely on a program to assign individuals they encounter threat
assessment scores based on reviews of data on these individuals from “arrest reports, property
records, commercial databases, deep Web searches and . . . social-media postings.” Justin Jouvenal,
The New Way Police Are Surveilling You: Calculating Your Threat ‘Score,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 10,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/the-new-way-police-are-surveillingyou-calculating-your-threat-score/2016/01/10/e42bccac-8e15-11e5-baf4-bdf37355da0c_story.html
[https://perma.cc/K747-3BT5].
191. ARJIS could have built a more sweeping tool, for example by comparing photos officers
take to those contained in the California Department of Motor Vehicles photo database, which
would have allowed police officers to identify a broader range of people. The fact that ARJIS did
not do that is an example of how a tool can be designed to protect privacy. For an exploration of
privacy by design, see ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES,
https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/03/fred_carter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET5FR25A]; Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 1373, 1436–38 (2000) (“[L]aw can and should establish a new set of institutional
parameters that supply incentives for the design of privacy-enhancing technologies to flourish.)”; Ira
S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409, 1413 (2011) (“This
Article seeks to clarify the meaning of privacy by design and to suggest how privacy officials might
develop appropriate regulatory incentives that offset the certain economic costs and somewhat
uncertain privacy benefits of this new approach.”).
192. Compare Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS,
at 0:59:05 (Jan. 18, 2013), http://sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=PSC011813
(agenda item no. 7, “Facial Recognition in the Field”) (last visited Dec. 17, 2016) (discussion of
when use of facial recognition tool is permissible in 2013) with ARJIS ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY
FOR FACIAL RECOGNITION, supra note 186, at 2 (2015 policy which more extensively limited the
use of facial recognition technology).
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development, testing and evaluation.” 193 ARJIS dubbed its facial
recognition program the Tactical Identification System, or TACIDS. 194
The project proved technically complex and its development stretched
on for several years. 195 In 2011, ARJIS appears to have deployed
TACIDS for the first time. 196
Although it took ARJIS years to develop TACIDS, it used this time to
conduct research with the goal of identifying an effective product. 197
ARJIS consulted with the FBI’s Biometric Center of Excellence and the
California Department of Justice, as well as local user groups.198 It
identified numerous vendors of facial recognition technology that
catered to law enforcement customers and vetted them thoroughly
through use of questionnaires, on-site visits, and product
demonstrations. 199
While the technical complexities of TACIDS may have slowed its
rollout, it quickly proved to be popular once it got into law enforcement
agents’ hands. By 2013, when EFF and CIR alerted the public to the
program, there were 178 tablets with facial recognition capability in use
by officers, and other officers regularly emailed photos to those with
tablets so the photos could be run through the system. 200 ARJIS staff
members started to think bigger and bolder. They began to contemplate
applying the software to fixed cameras from court buildings and public

193. See NIJ Awards in FY 2007, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 8, 2008),
http://www.nij.gov/funding/awards/pages/2007.aspx [https://perma.cc/7UHK-WMWM] (grant no.
2007-RG-CX-K001).
194. See id.; Letter from Regina B. Schofield, Assistant Attorney Gen., Department of Justice, to
Dr. Pamela Scanlon, Automated Regional Justice Information System 1 (Sept. 13, 2007),
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/01_-_tacids_award_letter_2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PVXDUSL] (confirming the award of the grant from the Department of Justice); AUTOMATED REG’L
JUSTICE INFO. SYS., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE FY07 FINAL PROPOSAL: INFORMATION-LED POLICING:
TACTICAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (TACIDS) 4 (2007), https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/02__5214-mandatory_tacids_-_final_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFQ9-7SV8].
195. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, GMS PROGRESS REPORTS—COMPILATION (2012),
https://www.eff.org/files/2013/11/07/12_-_tacids_report_summary_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN2GV5ZG] (semi-annual TACIDS status reports for National Institute of Justice from Oct. 1, 2007
through June 30, 2012).
196. TACIDS, supra note 188, at 29–33.
197. Id. at 7–17.
198. Id. at 7–9.
199. Id. at 10–16.
200. See Lynch & Maass, supra note 183. ARJIS leveraged Samsung devices (250 tablets and 50
smartphones) obtained for Terrorism Liaison Officers. See SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, PUBLIC
SAFETY COMMITTEE AGENDA (Jan. 18, 2013), http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3535
_15446.pdf [https://perma.cc/94R2-TF5E] (discussing agenda item no. 7, “Facial Recognition in the
Field”).
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transportation facilities, presumably to screen for wanted persons. 201 An
ARJIS staffer stated that “the facial recognition software is not currently
used as surveillance as yet, but is in future plans.” 202
EFF’s and CIR’s investigations caused SANDAG board members to
become concerned about the ARJIS facial recognition program. 203 At
around the same time, SANDAG was sued over a different ARJIS
surveillance program, the use of automatic license plate readers to
capture and store the time and location of vehicles observed around the
city. 204 These developments sparked an awakening for SANDAG board
members, who realized they did not understand what ARJIS did or how
it was managed. 205 Members reported being only dimly aware of the
license plate and facial recognition programs, which they found alarming
given that the entity they were charged with running had been sued over
the former and was under public scrutiny because of the latter. Having
been caught off guard, some SANDAG board members were concerned
that decisions about SANDAG’s law enforcement activities that
implicated public policy were not flowing upward to the board. 206
Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom instituted a review of the Public
Safety Committee and the programs it oversees for the SANDAG
board. 207 The review concluded that the Public Safety Committee was
201. See SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, supra note 200.
202. SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, CHIEFS’/SHERIFF’S MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AGENDA 6
(Apr. 3, 2013), http://www.sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3671_15747.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8WGQ-CBNA] (statement of ARJIS staff member Lloyd Muenzer).
203. See Meetings Audio Archives, Board of Directors, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, at 0:08:38
(July 11, 2014), http://sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=BOD071114 (last visited
Dec. 17, 2016) [hereinafter SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014] (statement of Lemon Grove
Mayor Mary Sessom) (discussing agenda item no. 2, “Public Safety Program at SANDAG”).
204. See Lee Ann O’Neal, SANDAG Knows Where You’ve Been, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June
17, 2013), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/jun/17/license-plate-reader-LPR-san-diegosurveillance/ [https://perma.cc/CZ3W-KYU6]. The agency had amassed a database of some 32
million plate hits, which were accessible to agents throughout the region. The lawsuit did not allege
that the plate reader program was unlawful. Rather, a private citizen sued ARJIS under the public
records act, demanding to see what records it was keeping on the movements of his vehicle.
205. See SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 203.
206. According to SANDAG Board member Ron Roberts, a member of the San Diego County
Board of Supervisors, “as a member here, it would have been impossible to know what was going
on. [The Board] was buried in the budgets . . . it would have taken years of research to find exactly
what was being done, what was money being spent on, to what extent were there policies that were
guiding this.” SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 203, at 1:23:37.
207. See Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS , at
1:06:17, 1:08:06 (June 20, 2014) http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&
mid=PSC062014 (agenda item no. 7, “Public Safety at SANDAG—Policy Review”) (containing
statements of SANDAG Strategic Advisor Diane Eidam and Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom)
(last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
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out of step with SANDAG’s overall structure. 208 Other SANDAG
committees reserved their voting membership almost exclusively to
elected representatives, but unelected officials, primarily from law
enforcement, controlled nine of the Public Safety Committee’s fifteen
positions. 209 The committee was also unique in creating a standing
subcommittee—the Chiefs’/Sheriff’s management committee—“that is
accorded more responsibility and authority than the Policy Advisory
Committee itself.” 210 The report concluded that “current policy and
practice do not provide a mechanism to ensure that the [Public Safety
Committee] and [SANDAG] Board have the opportunity to weigh in on
public policy issues related to ARJIS.” 211 To rectify matters, the review
recommended reallocating votes so that elected officials had a 6-5
majority on the Public Safety Committee and also requiring that the
SANDAG board approve all applications ARJIS wished to submit for
federal grant funds. 212
The SANDAG board did approve the grant application
recommendation. 213 But it rejected a 6-5 vote split, and instead adopted a
6-6 allocation of votes between elected representatives and law
enforcement agents. 214 Chula Vista Police Chief David Bejarano,
speaking on behalf of the San Diego County Chiefs and Sheriffs
Association, stated that preserving law enforcement agents’ control
would enable them to “use our hundreds of years of experience . . . as
subject matter experts . . . so we continue to have, again, the best
operational practices, the best policy as we move forward in maximizing
our technology.” 215 In addition, law enforcement agents framed the issue
as one of equality between themselves and elected representatives. As
Bejarano put it, “We simply want an equal voice at the table.” 216 This
208. See id.
209. SANDAG Board Agenda, July 11, 2014, supra note 167 (Public Safety Program Review).
210. Id. at 13.
211. Id. at 14.
212. Id.; SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 203, at 1:21:44 (statement of
Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom).
213. SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS AGENDA (Sept. 26, 2014),
http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_3863_18225.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VQ7Z-LRK5]
(agenda item no. 14-09-18, “Public Safety at SANDAG—Policy Review”) (recommending
reducing the number of unelected members so that it was equal to the number of elected members).
214. See id.
215. SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 200, at 1:02:13 (statement of David
Bejarano).
216. Meetings Audio Archives, Executive Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, at 0:40:52
(Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings.sc&mid=EC091214 (last
visited Dec. 17, 2016).
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view—that there should be equal numbers of votes for elected and
unelected representatives—prevailed, although there were some
dissenters. SANDAG board member and Escondido Mayor Sam Abed’s
comment was representative of the dissenters: “We are the elected
officials. If we have to answer to our voters, then we have to be in
charge of policy. We are not compromising with other elected officials.
We are compromising with staff. This is a very fundamental institutional
issue.” 217
Throughout the debate, no civil liberties groups or members of the
public showed up to express their views. SANDAG officials seemed
unaware that drawing on community expertise was even an option.
When asked by one board member whether ARJIS had consulted with
local civil liberties groups, Sessom stated: “This is a new, emerging
field, and there’s not a lot of privacy experts here.” 218 (In fact, San Diego
has a robust local ACLU affiliate.) 219 ARJIS staff said that instead of
turning to civil liberties groups, they had relied on the International
Association of Chiefs of Police and the DHS for guidance. 220
In the wake of public attention to facial recognition technology and
board members’ concerns regarding oversight, ARJIS created, and the
SANDAG board adopted, an acceptable-use policy for its facial
recognition technology. 221 The policy’s data handling provisions are
reasonably protective of privacy, allowing for only data collection and
retention necessary for the program to meet its specified purposes. The
policy states that facial recognition should be used “for official law
enforcement purposes only,” and that “releasing data . . . for non-law
enforcement purposes is prohibited.” 222 It further specifies that the
technology should only be used under two circumstances. First, it can be
used to assist in the identification of individuals who have been detained
based on reasonable suspicion and who do not have identification or

217. Meetings Audio Archives, Public Safety Committee, SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS , at
0:49:33, 1:08:06 (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.sandag.org/index.asp?fuseaction=meetings
.sc&mid=BOD092614 (last visited Dec. 17, 2016).
218. SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 201, at 1:14:15 (statement of
Lemon Grove Mayor Mary Sessom).
219. Cf. Board and Staff Information, ACLU SAN DIEGO, https://www.aclusandiego.org/aboutus/board-and-staff-information/ [https://perma.cc/M8HV-ZZE9] (illustrating staff size).
220. SANDAG Board of Directors July 11, 2014, supra note 201, at 1:14:46 (statement of Pam
Scanlon).
221. SAN DIEGO ASS’N OF GOV’TS, BOARD OF DIRECTORS MEETING MINUTES 2 (Feb. 13,
2015), http://sandag.org/uploads/meetingid/meetingid_4066_19049.pdf [https://perma.cc/GDQ7FPYB].
222. See ARJIS ACCEPTABLE USE POLICY FOR FACIAL RECOGNITION, supra note 186, at 3.
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who appear to be using false identification. 223 Second, it can be used to
identify individuals who are unable to identify themselves, such as
deceased or incapacitated individuals. 224 The only data collected are the
photos officers take, and those are deleted within twenty-four hours. 225
The policy is silent on the issue of sharing but, given the aggressive data
deletion schedule, sharing with other agencies would be out of step with
the general tenor of the policy.
In the meantime, the TACIDS user base continues to grow. By
February 2015, there were approximately 800 registered TACIDS users
representing twenty-eight law enforcement agencies.
3.

Analysis of Surveillance Policy Making by the San Diego
Association of Governments

In this case study, ARJIS’s status as a regional law enforcement
authority was a major reason why San Diego rolled out facial
recognition technology in a non-transparent fashion. The public is
largely ignorant of SANDAG’s existence. The normal, everyday
trappings of legislative oversight are absent: SANDAG board members
hold their meetings in front of empty public galleries, without much
press attention.
Federal funding made it unclear whose job it is to set a use policy for
facial recognition technology. Options include the federal government
(because it paid for the technology), SANDAG (because it received the
funding and developed and promulgated the technology), and end user
law enforcement agencies (because they deploy the technology in the
field). In contrast to Seattle and Oakland, the federal government funded
TACIDs through a program specifically designed for law enforcement,
not national security purposes. This meant the goals of federal funders
and the local grantee were aligned. The grant was designed to promote
information-led policing, and that is exactly what ARJIS wanted to do.
This case study provides little in the way of lessons for increasing
transparency and democratic accountability for surveillance policy
making. Although SANDAG did take steps to increase its oversight of
ARJIS, its governance limitations are fundamental and due to the
structure of the organization.

223. Id. at 2.
224. Id. at 3.
225. Id. at 5.
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Lessons from Case Studies

Collectively, the case studies contain lessons about the structural and
institutional factors that lead to surveillance policy making by
procurement. They also demonstrate the confusion federal spending
programs can generate about who is responsible for policy decisions and
some of the spillover effects the federal government’s national security
programs can have on more routine forms of policing. Finally, they point
toward some ways to bring a greater measure of transparency and
accountability to local surveillance policy making.
The three case studies reveal strikingly different ways that law
enforcement agencies set surveillance policy without the meaningful
involvement of elected representatives or members of the public. In
Seattle, the police department was chronically unable or unwilling to
bring city council members into the loop regarding its surveillance
initiatives. 226 In Oakland, city staff diligently kept the city council
apprised of its plans, but it took a few years for council members and
members of the public to grasp what they were being told. 227 In San
Diego, SANDAG’s organizational structure left ARJIS largely
unsupervised, an issue compounded by SANDAG also being
comparatively remote from residents of the geographic area it serves. 228
In all three cases, the federal government provided funding for
surveillance technology acquisition but did not require that any
guidelines be developed for protecting civil rights and liberties or that
there be meaningful involvement by members of the public or elected
representatives. This left elected representatives scrambling to impose
such guidelines retroactively after programs became controversial.
Further, the case studies highlight the interplay between federal
programs designed to enhance national security and more routine local
law enforcement practices. In Seattle, the federal government’s national
security objectives were irrelevant to the local debate, which turned on
the impacts of surveillance technology on day-to-day policing. 229 In
Oakland, the federal government’s national security objectives were an
additional strike against the surveillance center. 230 By contrast, it is
worth asking whether the alignment between DOJ’s goal of promoting

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra section II.A.2.
See supra section II.B.2.
See supra section II.C.2.
See supra section II.A.2.
See supra section II.B.2.
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information-led policing and ARJIS’s organizational mission contributed
to the successful adoption of facial recognition technology. 231
The case studies also suggest ways in which local surveillance policy
can be made more transparent and accountable, but none is likely to be a
global fix. A Seattle-style surveillance equipment ordinance will require
law enforcement agencies to produce data management protocols and, as
a result, think through key data management issues. Whether the process
of obtaining council approval will be pro forma or will result in
meaningful public engagement remains to be seen. The Oakland
innovation of forming a privacy advisory committee is a viable solution
for that community, but likely depends too heavily on the time and
expertise of local residents to work in many other places. San Diego
restored some measure of democratic control over ARJIS’s surveillance
initiatives, but SANDAG is so divorced from the population it is
designed to serve that it is hard to see this as a substantial improvement
in accountability.
III. BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF SURVEILLANCE POLICY
MAKING BY PROCUREMENT FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
This Part explores the broader implications of the case studies. It first
considers what factors are relevant to setting surveillance policy.
Surveillance technology has the potential to enhance public safety but
also poses risks to privacy and other civil liberties and rights.232 Because
benefits and costs are empirically uncertain and setting surveillance
policy requires trading off incommensurable values, there is no uniform
answer to how much or what type of surveillance is appropriate.233
However, there is widespread agreement that deployment of surveillance
technology ought to be governed by a policy setting out how the
technology will be used and that such policies should address the key
issues of data collection, retention, use, and sharing. 234 Thus, the fact
that all three case studies resulted in the proliferation of surveillance
technology ungoverned by such policies suggests a structural defect in
how surveillance policy is set.
This Part then considers the implications of the case studies for how
we think about accountability when the federal government encourages
local surveillance without requiring adoption of use policies. The
231.
232.
233.
234.

See supra section II.C.2.
See infra section III.A.
See infra section III.A.
See infra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has privileged federal interventions in the form of
conditional grants-in-aid over federal interventions that commandeer
state and local officials precisely because of its view that spending
programs do a better job of preserving clear lines of accountability. 235
But the case studies show that spending programs can generate
considerable confusion over who is responsible for policy choices. This
may be particularly true when the government creates policy voids by
incompletely addressing a policy matter.
Finally, this Part situates the case studies within the federal
government’s broader efforts to work more closely with local law
enforcement agencies to prevent, investigate, and respond to acts of
terror. 236 Particularly given the dual-purpose nature of much surveillance
technology, these initiatives tend to bleed over into how local officers
conduct routine policing. 237 This suggests that any cost-benefit analysis
of the federal government’s national security programs should consider
not only their impact on national security but also on law enforcement,
including transparency and accountability.
A.

Considerations for Selecting Surveillance Policy

Optimizing surveillance policy requires assessing the capacity of
technology to aid in the prevention and detection of criminal activity
while identifying possible harms to privacy, free speech, and other civil
rights and liberties. While there is no one-size-fits-all solution to how a
surveillance technology should be utilized, every surveillance scheme
raises the same basic questions about what data should be collected, how
long it should be stored, what uses should be made of it, and with whom
it should be shared. Thus, while surveillance outcomes may be
heterogeneous, the basic factors that every policy maker should consider
are the same.
Surveillance technology has many potential benefits for advancing
public safety. For example, technologies facilitating data collection can
gather information relevant to investigating crime, as in the case of
wiretapping the telephone of someone suspected of illegal activity. 238
The value of the large-scale collection of data on individuals’ activities
made possible by modern computer-driven technology is less clear. Law
235. See infra section III.B.
236. See infra section III.C.
237. See infra section III.C.
238. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967) (concerning electronic
surveillance of a telephone booth).
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enforcement agencies assert that large-scale data collection can play a
role in investigating criminal activity, including terrorism, or in
apprehending the perpetrators of such activity. Even data gathered with
no immediate suspect or crime in mind can be useful in some future
investigation. For example, New Jersey’s attorney general claimed that
“careful analysis of stored [automated license plate reader] data
can . . . be used to detect suspicious activities that are consistent with the
modus operandi of criminals.” 239 In addition, deploying surveillance
technology in a visible manner may deter crime. 240 For example, a
prominent study in San Francisco demonstrated that the deployment of
surveillance cameras resulted in a substantial decline in property
crimes. 241 The impact was on larceny theft; the deployment of
surveillance cameras had no impact on violent crimes. 242
Against these benefits of surveillance technology and large-scale data
collection, it is necessary to consider their potential to cause harm. Neil
Richards has argued that surveillance can “chill the exercise of . . . civil
liberties,” particularly by threatening “intellectual privacy.” 243 He also
239. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., STATE OF N.J., DIRECTIVE NO. 2010-5, 2 (2010),
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/Dir-2010-5-LicensePlateReadersl-120310.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W5EM-SN9Q] (italics in original). The Texas Department of Public Safety
likewise asserted that stored license plate reader data “will enable various forms of crime analysis;
for example, DPS will be able to trace the movements of felony vehicles over time (in hindsight)
that travel specific routes from the border on a regular basis and help determine patterned
movements associated with drugs/money/human trafficking.” TEX. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY,
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE COLLECTION, STORAGE, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF
AUTOMATED LICENSE PLATE READER DATA 3, 26 (2014), https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/
administration/crime_records/pages/LPRPIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QA4-PNZT].
240. See, e.g., JENNIFER KING, DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN & STEVEN RAPHAEL, U.C. BERKELEY
CTR. FOR INFO. TECH. IN THE INTEREST OF SOC’Y, REPORT: THE SAN FRANCISCO COMMUNITY
SAFETY CAMERA PROGRAM—AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SAN FRANCISCO’S
COMMUNITY SAFETY CAMERAS 11–12 (2008); The Effect of CCTV on Public Safety: Research
Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (Feb. 11, 2014), http://journalistsresource.org/studies/
government/criminal-justice/surveillance-cameras-and-crime
[https://perma.cc/VLV9-GSRW]
(canvassing scholarly evaluations of the deterrent effect of surveillance cameras in public places).
241. KING ET AL., supra note 238, at 11–12.
242. Id.
243. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013). But
see Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to
Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 265, 269 (2013) (criticizing Richards’s
approach as “too narrow” and contending that the real danger comes not just from diminishing the
zone of intellectual privacy but from surveillance of many different types of activities where that
surveillance is “broad, indiscriminate, and continuous”). See also David Gray & Danielle Citron,
The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013) (elaborating on their theory that it is
the quantity of data that is collected that causes harm); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87
TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008) (exploring the importance of intellectual privacy as a precondition for free
expression).
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contends that it can skew the balance of power between those engaged in
surveillance and their targets, increasing the risk that targets will be
subjected to “discrimination, coercion, and the threat of selective
enforcement.” 244 Focusing in on a narrower aspect of surveillance,
Katherine J. Strandburg has emphasized the way surveillance of
relationships, particularly emergent relationships formed online,
threatens First Amendment-protected associational activity. 245
Practitioners have identified similar harms. For example, the
International Association of Chiefs of Police stated, “the risk is that
individuals will become more cautious in the exercise of their protected
rights of expression, protest, association, and political participation
because they consider themselves under constant surveillance.” 246
Surveillance technology may go beyond deterring conduct that is
unlawful and inhibit or deter the legal and beneficial activities that
citizens conduct in a free society.
The possibility that people will be targeted because of their political
or religious beliefs is not merely theoretical. 247 In the mid-2000s, for
244. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 243, at 1935.
245. Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2008) (“First Amendment freedom
of association guarantees must provide an additional check, distinct from the Fourth Amendment’s
protections from unreasonable search and seizure, on overreaching relational surveillance
potential.”). Other scholars have also articulated the harm to First Amendment-protected activities
that surveillance can cause. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 114 (2007) (“First Amendment activities are implicated by a
wide array of law enforcement data-gathering activities.”). More broadly, theories of privacy harm
abound in legal scholarship. See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of
Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1343 (2015) (contending that privacy harm results when
previously obscure information becomes readily accessible); Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating RealWorld Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113 (2015) (asserting that privacy harm occurs when new
technologies divulge information that was private previously, and that individuals react by
modifying their behavior to achieve the prior level of disclosure); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as
Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 143 (2004) (positing that “a privacy violation has
occurred when either contextual norms of appropriateness or norms of flow have been breached”);
Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 281, 299–303 (2011) (identifying myriad harms that mass surveillance can cause, including
the likelihood of false positives, a greater risk of discrimination and profiling, and more potential for
police corruption).
246. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT FOR THE
UTILIZATION OF LICENSE PLATE READERS 13 (2009), http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LPR_
Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YXW-EYPG].
247. In addition to the recent examples discussed in the accompanying text, there are historical
examples as well. Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d,
787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986) involved a challenge to various surveillance and investigative practices
directed at political organizations by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in the 1970s.
The case was settled with a consent decree entered in 1985 in which the NYPD was prohibited from
investigating political and religious organizations and groups unless there was “specific
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example, the Maryland State Police engaged in surveillance of political
groups ranging from Amnesty International to advocates of bike lanes, a
practice the governor condemned as “undemocratic” and that the
Maryland State Police later acknowledged was a mistake. 248 Human
rights advocates and civil liberties groups criticized the New York Police
Department’s extensive surveillance of political protestors during
Occupy Wall Street. 249 In Birmingham, United Kingdom, law
enforcement agents installed a network of 200 cameras in predominantly
Muslim communities on the pretense that it was a crime prevention
measure. 250 When members of the public discovered that the cameras
were actually part of a covert anti-terrorism initiative, many expressed
concerns about discriminatory targeting based on religion. 251
In addition to harms that result from official policy or practice, there
is always the possibility of abusive use of surveillance equipment by
individual officers for their own reasons. There are numerous examples
of police officers using department GPS devices to track the vehicles of
ex-girlfriends. 252 Access to databases can also be abused. In
Minneapolis, a female police officer obtained a $1 million settlement

information” that the group was linked to a crime that had been committed or was about to be
committed. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1420–21. Another example is the Church Committee
revelations. In 1975, the Church Committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, held a series of
hearings and published fourteen reports as it investigated intelligence operations by the CIA, NSA,
and FBI, including attempts to assassinate foreign leaders, spying on Martin Luther King, Jr., and
monitoring the political activities of other U.S. citizens. See generally S. REP. NO. 94-755, at pt. 3
(1976).
248. Lisa Rein & Josh White, More Groups Than Thought Monitored in Police Spying, WASH.
POST, Jan. 9, 2009, at A01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/01/03/
ST2009010302013.html [https://perma.cc/D66Z-EJYT].
249. See, e.g., THE GLOB. JUSTICE CLINIC (N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW) & THE WALTER LEITNER INT’L
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT THE LEITNER CTR. FOR INT’L LAW AND JUSTICE (FORDHAM LAW SCH.),
SUPPRESSING PROTEST: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO OCCUPY WALL
STREET 93–98 (2012), http://chrgj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/suppressingprotest.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KPV6-BB2X].
250. See Pete Fussey & Jon Coaffee, Urban Spaces of Surveillance, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 201, 207 (Kirstie Ball et al. eds., 2012); Paul Lewis, CCTV Aimed at
Muslim Areas in Birmingham to be Dismantled, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2010, 4:45 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/oct/25/birmingham-cctv-muslim-areas-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/WSZ5-Q58S].
251. See Paul L. Lewis, Surveillance Cameras Spring Up in Muslim Areas–the Targets?
Terrorists, THE GUARDIAN (June 4, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jun/04/
birmingham-surveillance-cameras-muslim-community [https://perma.cc/CA2E-8NA5].
252. See, e.g., Robert J. Lopez, Officer Accused of Hiding GPS Device in Woman’s Car, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2010, 4:40 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2010/04/costa-mesapolice.html [https://perma.cc/J4MA-WR3P].
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after more than 400 of her colleagues accessed her driver’s license
record out of pure voyeurism. 253
There is no single solution to whether and how a particular
surveillance technology should be deployed. A high-crime community
might tolerate more surveillance than a low-crime community. A
community with a strong civil libertarian streak might prefer to face a
greater safety risk than to restrict civil liberties. A community such as
Oakland, which holds its police department in low regard, might be less
willing than other communities to entrust its police department with
potentially invasive surveillance technology. 254
However, every data collection scheme implicates the same questions
about data collection, retention, use, and sharing. What data should be
collected? How long should the data that is collected be stored? What
uses of stored data should be allowed? With whom should data be shared
and on what terms? The importance of these basic questions to any data
management scheme is broadly recognized. 255 For example, they are at
the heart of the Fair Information Practices, “a set of internationally
recognized practices for addressing the privacy of information about
individuals.” 256 They also form the core of the Privacy Act, which
controls the collection, retention, use, and sharing of information about

253. Kim Zetter, Female Cop Gets $1 Million After Colleagues Trolled Database to Peek at Her
Pic, WIRED (Nov. 5, 2012, 4:02 PM), http://www.wired.com/2012/11/payout-for-cop-databaseabuse/ [https://perma.cc/FAZ7-T4KG].
254. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1259–60 (2004) (“There are varying local preferences about the balance
between individual liberties and actions government might take to increase the physical security of
its citizens. There is also variation in how much local citizens desire to exercise a particular liberty
and how serious the threat to physical safety in their area is.”).
255. See generally ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: A BASIC HISTORY
(2015), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/E538-X9QU]. The Fair
Information Practices include additional elements, but some of them are a poor fit for the law
enforcement context. For example, they state that data “should be obtained by lawful and fair means
and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.” OECD Privacy
Principles, OECD, http://oecdprivacy.org/ [https://perma.cc/4AYY-PX7X] (emphasis added).
Needless to say, the government’s interest in enforcing the criminal code would often be frustrated
by requiring the government to obtain an investigative target’s consent. Also, some scholars use
slightly different labels to capture the core data management concepts, or break them down into
more or fewer elements. Compare Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative
Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1112 (2016) (referencing “collection, access, sharing,
retention, and use”) with Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1880 (2013) (discussing “collection, use, and disclosure”). This
does not appear to be a disagreement about what elements are important. Rather, the term “use” is
sufficiently broad that it can include the concepts of retention and access. How granularly to break
down the core data management concepts depends on an author’s purpose.
256. GELLMAN, supra note 255, at 1.
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individuals that is maintained in systems of records by federal
agencies. 257 Thus, while surveillance policy outcomes may vary from
community to community, the process by which surveillance policy is
set should always involve consideration of the same factors. Yet in all
three case studies, the federal government’s decision to fund surveillance
technology without requiring or encouraging adoption of a use policy
had the practical result of no such use policy being promulgated. This in
turn suggests that there is a structural flaw in how we are setting
surveillance policy in this context.
B.

Accountability and Levels of Government

In the case studies, the fact that the federal government funded
acquisition of surveillance technology but was silent on protections for
civil rights and liberties created genuine confusion over which elected
officials bore ultimate responsibility for how such technology would be
used. This observation is important because the primary reason the
United States Supreme Court has privileged spending programs over
initiatives that “commandeer” sub-federal officials is because of its
assessment that spending programs do a better job of preserving clear
lines of accountability. The case studies cast doubt on whether this is
descriptively accurate, reinforcing existing scholarship that has made
this point in other contexts or in more abstract terms.
The Supreme Court has held that the structural protections of the
Constitution forbid Congress from commandeering sub-federal officials.
The prohibition is absolute: “[t]he Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor
command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” 258 By contrast,
Congress enjoys wide latitude to influence state and local actions by
placing conditions on grants-in-aid to states. It can spend money in any
area that promotes the general welfare, subject to a small number of
modest restrictions: conditions on grants must be unambiguous, related
to the federal interest in a national project or program, and must not
induce the states to act unconstitutionally. 259 Moreover, these programs
must not cross the “point at which pressure turns into compulsion.” 260
257. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); see also id. §§ 552a(e)(1)–(2) (imposing
limitations on data collection, retention, and use); § 552a(b) (imposing limitations on data sharing).
258. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
259. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
260. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
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Until its recent ruling invalidating a portion of the Affordable Care Act,
the Court had never determined that a federal grant was impermissibly
coercive. 261
According to the Court, conditional spending is preferable to
commandeering because spending programs preserve local political
processes: “the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to
whether or not the State will comply.” 262 Thus, “[i]f a state’s citizens
view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may
elect to decline a federal grant.” 263 This, in turn, promotes
accountability: “[w]here Congress encourages state regulation rather
than compelling it, state governments remain responsive to the local
electorate’s preferences; state officials remain accountable to the
people.” 264 By contrast, “where the Federal Government directs the
States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of
public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their
decision.” 265
Some scholars have criticized the Court’s accountability-based
distinction between commandeering and spending, suggesting that if
obscuring accountability is a problem, it “seems to condemn not merely
federal laws that commandeer state or local services but also even
voluntary intergovernmental cooperation.” 266 Others dispute that
261. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The Chief Justice therefore—for the first
time ever—finds an exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive.” (emphasis
in original)). For a discussion of the impact of National Federation of Independent Business on the
federal government’s spending power, see generally Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power After
NFIB v. Sebelius, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71 (2014).
262. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
263. Id.
264. Id.; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602 (“Permitting the Federal
Government to force the states to implement a federal program would threaten the political
accountability key to our federal system.”); id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress effectively
engages in this impermissible compulsion when state participation in a federal spending program is
coerced, so that the States’ choice whether to enact or administer a federal regulatory program is
rendered illusory.”).
265. New York, 505 U.S. at 169. Some scholars question whether commandeering poses
accountability problems. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A
Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1632 (2006) (“[I]t seems likely that citizens who
pay attention to public affairs and who care to inquire will be able to discern which level of
government is responsible for a government regulation, and citizens who do not care to inquire may
be largely beyond judicial or political help on the accountability front.”).
266. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 826 (1998)
(emphasis in original); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law:
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spending programs can create meaningful accountability problems. 267
The case studies provide reason to side with the former group. Putting
doctrine to the side for a moment, it is worth thinking through who was
responsible for surveillance policy in the case studies. The federal
government allocated millions of dollars for surveillance equipment
acquisition but did not require anyone to think through key questions of
data management. Local law enforcement agencies took the money, but
also did not devise a data management plan. Local elected officials
signed off formally, but with no or only a dim understanding of what the
law enforcement agency it supervised was acquiring.
Which elected officials are to blame for the fact that no one thought
through basic questions of data collection, retention, use, and sharing?
Federal officials, because the federal government appropriated the
money and designed the procedures through which localities could elect
to participate? 268 Local elected officials, because they signed off on
acquisition of the technologies? Both? Neither? 269

Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2201–03 (1998) (pointing out that conditional
spending programs can also be confusing for voters); Siegel, supra note 265, at 1681 (“Nor is it
apparent generally that commandeering generates insurmountable accountability concerns, or that
preemption, conditional non-preemption, and conditional federal spending avoid similar
accountability problems.”); Edward A. Zelinsky, Accountability and Mandates: Redefining the
Problem of Federal Spending Conditions, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 482, 483 (1995)
(“Federal spending conditions tend to diffuse responsibility between Washington and the states,
leaving the political system less monitorable and accountable than it should be.”); Rebecca E.
Zietlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 141, 190 (2002) (“The reason for the anti-commandeering rule was the Court’s fear
that commandeering state officials would cause a lack of accountability and confuse state
voters . . . . Yet conditional funding arguably creates the same concern about accountability since
states agree to comply with conditions beyond their control in order to receive federal funds.”).
267. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After NFIB,
101 GEO. L.J. 861, 880 (2013) (questioning whether spending programs blur accountability to any
meaningful degree); Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 920 (2008)
(“Standing alone this voter-confusion story is not very persuasive. It may be true that voters will in
part blame their local officials for the results of conditional grants, but that is not confusion at all. It
takes two to contract, and local officials who make bad deals should be held to account for them,
whether those deals are with trash-collection contractors or Congress.”).
268. Bridget A. Fahey, Consent Procedures and American Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1561,
1565 (2015) (“In every program and for every grant that relies on the states’ voluntary participation,
the federal government decides how the states volunteer: which official or institution gets to speak
for the state, how the decision is presented to that speaker, what process the speaker must use to
communicate the state’s decision, and the timeline on which the decision must be made.”).
269. Role confusion is not without historical precedent. When the Church Committee examined
intelligence abuses that took place in the 1960s and 1970s, it concluded that the FBI dodged
criticism for deployment of controversial intelligence collection techniques by relying on local
police departments to do so. Waxman, supra note 10, at 298–99.
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The Supreme Court rejected commandeering because it makes it
difficult to know which elected officials are responsible for a policy
decision. The federal programs in the case studies are spending
programs, but all of the Supreme Court’s concerns about accountability
are present in this context as well. It was Congress that created the Port
Security Grant Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative, not local
representatives. Congress made the decision to allocate money for
surveillance equipment acquisition without requiring anyone to think
through data management. The consequences of these programs were
specific and local: the acquisition of surveillance technology by local
police departments to be used to engage in surveillance of local
populations. Naturally, public ire targeted these departments’ respective
city councils. And this anger was appropriate, given that these bodies
could have insisted on the formulation of policies but did not insist. But
federal elected representatives also could have insisted on the enactment
of policies; however, this inaction at the federal level has not been met
with similarly widespread public criticism.
The case studies cast doubt on whether the distinction the Court has
drawn between programs that commandeer and conditional spending
programs furthers its objective. And while the Court’s concern appears
to be whether the public can discern which political actors are
responsible for which decisions, there may be a deeper problem. It may
be that there is no good answer to who ought to be held responsible for a
policy choice. 270 In the case studies, the matter is genuinely unclear.
Probably the best answer is that both federal and local officials should
shoulder a portion of the blame—local officials for not attending to a
matter traditionally under local control, and federal officials for
intervening in such a matter without attending to all of the consequences
of their actions.
C.

Accountability and Policy Arenas

The case studies also highlight the possible collateral consequences of
federal national security initiatives on local policing. Some have argued
that the federal government must take a stronger hand at the local level if
it is to successfully prevent and respond to acts of terrorism. 271 But given

270. Perversely, it may be that federal spending programs that permit the maximum amount of
local flexibility and choice in implementation also foment the most serious difficulties in
determining who is responsible for policy choices. See Hills, supra note 266, at 827–28 (discussing
Martha A. Derthick’s classic study of the operation of public assistance programs in Massachusetts).
271. See supra notes 257–60 and accompanying text.
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the substantial overlap between the equipment and techniques used to
combat terrorism and those used to carry out routine law enforcement
functions, anti-terrorism initiatives are likely to have substantial
spillover effects on routine policing. This suggests that any cost-benefit
analysis of federal national security initiatives that incorporate local law
enforcement agencies ought to account for these initiatives’ impact on
policing, including the transparency of police practices and the
accountability of police for their actions, not just what they contribute to
federal national security priorities.
Both policy makers and scholars have contended that the federal
government must become more involved at the local level to advance the
War on Terror. Most famously, the 9/11 Commission concluded that
“[t]here is a growing role for state and local law enforcement agencies,”
but cautioned that “[t]hey need more training and work with federal
agencies so that they can cooperate more effectively with those federal
authorities in identifying terrorist suspects.” 272 Some scholars have also
endorsed this view, 273 articulating more specifically the areas in which
272. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT
390 (2004), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FLJ-ZL5G]; see
also PETER NEUMANN, BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN
AMERICA,
43–45
(2011),
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/
NSPG.pdf [https://perma.cc/LR9C-9BWY] (criticizing federal efforts to catalyze local involvement
in terrorism prevention as ineffectual); Matthew C. Waxman, Police and National Security:
American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 377, 377 (2009) (identifying calls by federal officials for greater federal-local collaboration
to prevent, investigate, and respond to terrorism).
273. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING TERRORISM 155–56 (2007) (“MI5 has been
able to do what the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have been unable to do—
integrate local police into the national domestic intelligence system. It is a vital mission. Local
police, border patrol, customs officers, and private security and intelligence personnel gather
enormous masses of information at the source, as it were. They are well positioned to notice
anomalies that may be clues to terrorist plotting. We need an agency that will integrate local police
and other information gatherers into a comprehensive national intelligence network, as MI5 has
done in Britain.”); Lindsey Garber, Have We Learned a Lesson? The Boston Marathon Bombings
and Information Sharing, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 221, 238–44 (2015) (discussing the importance of
state and local involvement to terrorism prevention measures); Steven R. Morrison, The System of
Domestic Counterterrorism Law Enforcement, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 341, 375 (2014) (“Over
time, it became apparent that expansive terrorist structures, instantiated in the spread of ideology
rather than institutional structure and the encouragement of lone wolf, homegrown operators rather
than cells connected to a center, required a mirroring law enforcement response. That response
includes calls for more local responses, is coded as traditional law enforcement, and is a relatively
novel approach”); Mitch Silber & Adam Frey, Detect, Disrupt, and Detain: Local Law
Enforcement’s Critical Roles in Combating Homegrown Extremism and the Evolving Terrorist
Threat, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 127, 145 (2013) (“Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has
become clear that local police departments have a role to play in the counterterrorism fight.”);
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2160 (2002) (“Local police
have already been affected by the terrorist attacks, and powerfully so. The FBI may have primary
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collaboration is likely to be fruitful, 274 and identifying challenges that
are likely to arise. 275
One such challenge is the inherent inseparability of initiatives to
combat terrorism from routine law enforcement functions. For example,
as Samuel J. Rascoff has pointed out, it is precisely because local police
officers develop rich and trusting relationships with local residents
through routine policing that they are also well positioned to pick up
information about possible terrorist threats.276 This capacity for
intelligence gathering presents an opportunity, but pursuing this aspect
of the job too aggressively may undermine community relationships that
are necessary to maintaining public safety and order. 277
The entwinement of national security and law enforcement functions
may be particularly acute when it comes to surveillance equipment. An
automatic license plate reader can be used to determine whether a
vehicle is registered to someone with an outstanding felony arrest
warrant, or it can be used to determine whether the vehicle is registered
to someone whose name is on a terrorist watch list. Stingrays, devices
used to pinpoint the geographic location of cell phones, can be used to
identify the locations of cell phone-carrying drug dealers, or they can be
used to identify the locations of cell phone-enabled improvised
explosive devices. Moreover, because terrorism is exceedingly rare
compared to other forms of crime, a particular piece of surveillance
equipment is vastly more likely to have an impact on criminal law
enforcement than it is to have an impact on terrorism-related
investigations. 278 This impact may be magnified given that local law
responsibility for investigating allegations, but that agency lacks the manpower to guard public
places. Local police must do so.”); Waxman, supra note 10, at 346–47 (contending that “many
aspects of counterterrorism intelligence will require centralized federal control and high degrees of
uniformity—even if they also necessarily involve coordination with local agencies”).
274. See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV.
1715, 1721 (2010) (advocating for “the creation of new federal-local collaborative structures that
will simultaneously enhance the analytic rigor and the legal oversight of local intelligence while
leaving undisturbed and exploiting to full effect the advantages that local intelligence possesses”).
275. Waxman, supra note 272, at 378 (explaining that the article “examines three national
security law challenges resulting from greater involvement of state and local police agencies in
protecting national security, especially in combating terrorism”).
276. Rascoff, supra note 274, at 1731–35.
277. Id. at 1738 (“This balanced portfolio—and the fact that local police are inevitably ‘repeat
players’ in the communities in which they operate—does, in fact, create powerful incentives for
police officers to negotiate a middle road when it comes to the more intrusive and potentially
objectionable aspects of counterterrorism.”).
278. This point is probably intuitive, but there is also some scattered empirical evidence to
support it. For example, in February 2013, the Tacoma, Washington, City Council accepted some
$190,000 in funds from the federal Port Security Grant Program to purchase an update to an
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enforcement agencies have more experience and knowledge about
routine criminal law enforcement than combatting terrorism and may
therefore be more readily positioned to envision creative uses of
surveillance equipment for law enforcement purposes.
The Seattle and Oakland case studies provide further support for the
idea that, although the purpose of a federal program may be to combat
terrorism, its effects may fall mostly on policing. (The San Diego case
study does not fit this mold because the federal program that funded it
was targeted at law enforcement practices.) Seattle paid for its drone
using funds from the Urban Areas Security Initiative, a program to help
urban areas prevent and recover from acts of terrorism. 279 Seattle did not
have the opportunity to use its drone, but its plans for the drone’s
deployment stretched beyond terrorism to include documenting traffic
accident scenes and searching for missing persons. 280 Seattle funded its
wireless mesh network through the Port Security Grant Program, which
is designed to help mitigate the risk that terrorists will exploit security

unnamed device, the purpose of which was “to assist in the prevention, detection, response, and
recovery of improvised explosive devices.” TACOMA CITY COUNCIL, MINUTES 1–2 (Mar. 19, 2013),
https://cityoftacoma.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=M&ID=331085&GUID=2FD1B1C7-F7BD4CED-87FD-2E7EB10DCA60 [https://perma.cc/65GZ-T32F]. Subsequent reporting by the Tacoma
News Tribune revealed that the device was a stingray. See Kate Martin, Tacoma Police Using
Surveillance Device to Sweep Up Cellphone Data, NEWS TRIB. (Aug. 26, 2014),
http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/local/article25878184.html [https://perma.cc/LS8X-KDD4].
A privacy advocate’s public records act request demonstrated that while the device had been used
168 times to investigate crimes from murder to assault to theft of a city laptop, not once had it been
used to detect an improvised explosive device. TACOMA POLICE DEP’T, RESPONSE TO PUBLIC
RECORDS ACT REQUEST OF PHIL MOCEK, https://d3gn0r3afghep.cloudfront.net/foia_files/
partial_response.pdf [https://perma.cc/K295-BVQV]. Automatic license plate readers provide
another example. In 2012, in a previous career as a staff attorney for the American Civil Liberties
Union, I worked with colleagues to file a public records act request with the Maryland fusion center
to obtain data on its use of automatic license plate readers. See ACLU, supra note 164 (describing
multi-state public records act initiative to uncover use of automatic license plate readers). The data
showed that between January and May of 2012, the fusion center collected about 35 million plate
reads. MARYLAND STATE POLICE, PUBLIC RECORDS ACT RESPONSE (2012), https://www.aclu.org/
files/FilesPDFs/ALPR/maryland/alprpra_msp_md%20(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/A6TK-RX6J]. Of
these, 59 reads were of cars registered to individuals listed on a violent gang or terrorist
organization watch list. See id. (that figure does not mean that these cars were actually driven by
gang members or terrorists; it just means that a person associated with the car had been placed on a
government watch list). By contrast, some 90,000 were associated with individuals driving on
suspended or revoked licenses, or who had not complied with the vehicle emissions program. See
id. The overwhelming majority pertained to the movements of vehicles whose owners were not
suspected of anything at all. See id.
279. See supra Part II.
280. Christine Clarridge, supra note 58 (discussing traffic investigations); SEATTLE POLICE
DEP’T, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 39, at 5.
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vulnerabilities at ports. 281 The mesh network would have had important
functions in an emergency, such as ensuring that first responders could
continue to communicate with one another even if the cellular network
became overloaded. 282 The mesh network facilitated the city’s placement
of surveillance cameras in downtown Seattle, cameras that were to have
been used for routine law enforcement purposes. 283 The Port Security
Grant Program also funded Oakland’s DAC. Given that the purpose of
the DAC was to improve port security by gaining a better understanding
of events in Oakland through establishment of a citywide surveillance
center, it, too, would have had a substantial impact on routine law
enforcement.
It is also worth asking whether the disconnect between the federal
government’s objectives in funding the technologies and the local law
enforcement agencies’ objectives in acquiring them contributed to the
failure of the Seattle and Oakland programs—and whether the identity of
interests of the federal government’s funding program and ARJIS’s
objectives was a factor in the success of ARJIS’s facial recognition
technology. The record is clear that Oakland tailored its proposal to
create a DAC around federal funding requirements, and although there is
inadequate information to draw this conclusion about Seattle’s
programs, it is a possibility. In San Diego, the obvious match, in interest
and expertise, between the DOJ funding program and ARJIS may have
contributed to the program being well-targeted at a pressing local law
enforcement need.
These programs are not the only documented examples where federal
initiatives created to combat terrorism by harnessing sub-federal law
enforcement agencies have had substantial spillover effects on law
enforcement practices. After 9/11, the federal government directed
considerable resources toward expanding the nation’s network of fusion
centers, state and local government entities designed to enhance
information sharing and analysis. 284 These centers have prioritized state
and local objectives over federal goals. 285

281. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-47, PORT SECURITY GRANT PROGRAM:
RISK MODEL, GRANT MANAGEMENT & EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES COULD BE STRENGTHENED 1
(2011), http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/587142.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT2P-NM76].
282. See supra section II.A.2.
283. See supra section II.A.2.
284. Jason Barnosky, Fusion Centers: What’s Working and What Isn’t, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
(Mar. 17, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/03/17/fusion-centers-whats-workingand-what-isnt/ [https://perma.cc/646S-D4V8].
285. See id.
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The observation that federal anti-terrorism programs have spillover
effects on routine law enforcement functions matters because
effectiveness of government programs ought to be evaluated in light of
all of their consequences. When federal programs provide funding to
sub-federal law enforcement agencies, any such evaluation should
account for not only their impact on the federal government’s national
security agenda, but also the impact on local policing. Additionally,
impact on local policing should be gauged in a holistic manner,
accounting for both benefits to public safety and costs to civil liberties,
as well as consequences on accountability and transparency of
policing. 286
IV. REMEDIES TO DEMOCRATIZE LOCAL SURVEILLANCE
POLICY MAKING
The preceding Parts demonstrate that the federal government fails to
ensure that local elected officials and members of the public are
involved in decisions about surveillance technology acquisition, or that
anyone develops a policy to govern this technology’s use. 287 They also
show that this failure can lead local law enforcement agencies to adopt
surveillance technologies that are out of step with local preferences. 288
They further suggest that local input can play a valuable role in ensuring
that surveillance policy is consistent with local crime rates, the
competence and trustworthiness of the police department, and local
political preferences. 289 Finally, the preceding Parts contend that while
different communities may reasonably decide to engage in greater or
lesser amounts of surveillance, all surveillance technology deployments
should be governed by policies addressing data collection, retention, use,
and sharing. 290
Building off of this descriptive and normative account, this Part offers
proposals for how to increase local democratic control of surveillance
policy and ensure that this policy addresses key data management issues.
Reform options include steps that elected representatives could take at
the federal, state, and local levels. The menu of reform options works to

286. Rachel A. Harmon makes a broadly similar point in arguing that federal public safety
programs should be evaluated in a way that accounts for the nonmonetary costs of policing,
including the costs of coercion. See Harmon, supra note 8.
287. See supra Part I.
288. See supra Part II.
289. See supra Part II.
290. See supra section III.A.
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capture all policy solutions that could work as a theoretical matter while
acknowledging that some are more politically feasible than others.
A. Federal Remedies
If part of the problem is that the federal government does not require
local elected representatives and members of the public to be involved in
decisions about what technologies law enforcement agencies acquire and
does not require anyone to develop use policies, then one possibility is
for the federal government to condition receipt of funding on completion
of these steps. A federal solution has particular appeal because only the
federal government could devise a remedy that would apply
comprehensively.
1.

Require Involvement of Elected Representatives in Decisions About
Technology Acquisition

There is nothing to stop the federal government from requiring that
local elected officials be involved in decisions about what surveillance
technologies local police departments acquire with federal money. As
discussed previously, the federal government has sweeping power to
place conditions on grants-in-aid. 291 Federal programs routinely
designate which state or local actors must elect to participate in other
federal programs. 292 To be sure, the case studies provide reason to doubt
that incorporating elected officials into the decision-making process,
without additional measures, will achieve meaningful oversight. But the
opportunity to weigh in is still a necessary precondition to such
oversight, and it is one local elected officials should be provided.
There are difficult and uncertain questions about how best to structure
the involvement of local elected representatives. One such question
pertains to timing. The sooner local elected officials become involved in
decisions regarding surveillance technology acquisition, the greater the
influence they will have over local surveillance policy. If local elected
officials were required to sign off on grant applications prior to
submission, then in theory it would not be too late for them to suggest
acquisition of different technologies (e.g., a red light camera instead of a
surveillance camera) or abandonment of the application altogether. By
the time the federal government has funded a specific grant proposal and
local elected officials face an up-or-down vote on whether to take the
291. See supra section III.B.
292. Fahey, supra note 268, at 1573–75.
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money, there is not the same opportunity for creative input. Also, cashstrapped municipalities may be reluctant to reject free equipment, even if
it is not the best match for local circumstances.
The case studies do not shed light on how pre-application
involvement would work out in practice because in no case did local law
enforcement agents seek such approval. 293 The fact that SANDAG’s
reform measures included Board review of grant applications prior to
submission suggests that at least some local governing bodies would
desire such authority. 294
2.

Require Meaningful Disclosure of Information to Elected
Representatives

In addition to requiring that local elected officials have an early
opportunity to weigh in on surveillance technology acquisition, the
federal government could also mandate that local elected officials
receive a written assessment of the impact of the surveillance technology
at issue. 295 This assessment could encompass not only the benefits to
public safety, but also the consequences for civil rights and liberties,
especially (given the nature of surveillance technology) for privacy.
However, assessments will only help when lack of information, rather
than inadequate comprehension or interest, impedes participation by
local elected representatives.
The federal government itself produces a couple of helpful models for
how this could work in practice. The first, a privacy impact assessment,
is a formalized “analysis of how personally identifiable information is
collected, retained, used, [and] shared.” 296 The E-Government Act of

293. Oakland city staff did provide the city council with an informational report about its plan to
seek a grant before the grant application deadline, but it did not seek council approval. See supra
section II.B.
294. SANDAG set up streamlined protocols for time-sensitive grant applications. See SAN DIEGO
ASS’N OF GOV’TS, supra note 213.
295. Thanks to Deirdre K. Mulligan for this suggestion. In 2006, Mulligan recommended that the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security require potential recipients of DHS grants for video
surveillance systems to conduct a privacy impact assessment. Prepared Statement of Deirdre K.
Mulligan before the Department of Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory
Committee 2 (June 7, 2006), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Mulligan_DHS_Statement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PDD7-3QT2].
296. Privacy Impact Assessments, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/
privacy-policy/privacy-impact-assessments [https://perma.cc/37H4-SULA]. For a detailed
consideration of the challenges of using privacy impact assessments to get government agencies to
consider privacy in addition to their primary objectives, see generally Kenneth A. Bamberger &
Deirdre K. Mulligan, PIA Requirements and Privacy Decision-Making in U.S. Government
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2002 requires all federal agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments
“for all new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains
or disseminates personally identifiable information.” 297 Among other
things, privacy impact assessments must “contain a risk assessment that
specifically identifies and evaluates potential threats to individual
privacy, discusses alternatives and identifies the appropriate risk
mitigation measures for each.” 298 The second, pioneered by the DHS
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, is the civil rights and civil
liberties impact assessment. 299 As the name suggests, this assessment
covers a broader range of rights and liberties than a privacy impact
assessment, but the general idea is the same.
To be sure, assessments will not be a cure-all. However, they would
likely be an improvement on the status quo. If the federal government
required local law enforcement agencies to conduct an assessment of any
surveillance technology they wish to acquire using federal funds, it
would help to ensure that these agencies thought through the impact of
surveillance technologies on protected rights and liberties. The
requirement to produce an assessment could be coupled with a mandate
that the assessment be made available to the public and provided to local
elected officials. 300 In that case, the assessment would also raise public
awareness about a local law enforcement agency’s surveillance plans
and aid local elected representatives in weighing in on surveillance
technology acquisition in an informed manner.
3.

Require that Surveillance Technologies Be Governed by Use
Policies

Finally, the federal government could require that all federally funded
surveillance technology be governed by a data management protocol that
addresses the fundamental questions of data collection, retention, use,
and sharing. Ideally, draft protocols would be shared with
representatives at the same time as the assessment described above, and
Agencies, in PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 225, 225–74 (David Wright & Paul De Hert eds.,
2012).
297. Privacy Impact Assessments, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://archives.gov/privacy/privacy-impactassessments/index.html [https://perma.cc/P84U-U2U4].
298. Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 295, at 228.
299. Civil Rights & Civil Liberties Impact Assessments, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/civil-rights-civil-liberties-impact-assessments [https://perma.cc/DMW4TYKS].
300. Some federal programs already require that states take steps to publicize, and even obtain
comment, on applications for grant funds. Fahey, supra note 266, at 1578.
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would be approved by local elected representatives prior to deployment.
The federal government already requires federally funded fusion centers
to have privacy policies. 301 There is no reason that other programs that
fund surveillance could not do the same.
***
The combination of early notice to elected representatives and
meaningful provision of information to them, in the form of assessments
and draft data management protocols, is consistent with scholarship
suggesting that enhanced accountability through external oversight can
help advance agencies’ secondary goals. 302 While this model still
depends on external oversight being conducted vigorously and
thoughtfully, these reforms should lead to greater consideration of
privacy and other civil liberties and rights than is currently the case.
B.

State Remedies

States could also adopt the reform measures advocated in the
preceding section. While states generally delegate policing policy to
local governments, they are free to take on this topic themselves.
Relying on every state to pass legislation is unlikely to result in a
remedy as comprehensive in scope as a federal-level solution, but there
may be more political willpower to tackle surveillance policy making by
procurement at the state level.
In recent years, states have been remarkably active in passing
legislation limiting law enforcement agencies’ use of surveillance
technologies. 303 In the aftermath of the heavily militarized response to

301. Barnosky, supra note 284.
302. See, e.g., Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 295, at 248.
303. For example, in 2015, California passed a comprehensive law, the California Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, requiring warrants for digital records of emails, texts, and
geolocation information, even when the data is stored in the cloud by service providers. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1546–1546.4 (West 2016). Virginia enacted legislation requiring law enforcement agencies
to obtain a warrant (except in limited circumstances) before employing a drone. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.2–60.1 (2015). North Carolina adopted a bill that requires state and local agencies employing
license plate readers to adopt a written use policy and sets limitations on data retention without a
warrant. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-183.22–24 (2015). For a useful compilation of state legislation
regarding drones (both pertaining to law enforcement use and otherwise), see Current Unmanned
Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 9, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/current-unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9J23-VN82] (thirty-two states have enacted laws and five have passed
resolutions). For a similar compilation for ALPR legislation, see Automated License Plate Readers:
State Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.ncsl.
org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/2014-state-legislation-related-to-
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protesters in Ferguson, states have also considered (and New Jersey has
passed) legislation requiring local government approval when police
departments seek to obtain surplus military equipment. 304 Surveillance
policy making by procurement resides at the intersection of these two
issues and should therefore be of interest to state legislatures as well.
Reforms enacted on the state level would not provide as
comprehensive a remedy as federal reforms because they would only go
into effect in those states that adopted them. However, they would
address more instances of surveillance policy making by procurement
than would relying on each local government to enact its own legislative
fix. Moreover, as Richard Briffault has pointed out, states have “greater
resources and greater ability to mobilize public attention that comes
from their relatively greater size and fewer numbers.” 305 California’s
passage of a data breach notification statute, requiring businesses and
agencies to provide notice to California customers whose personal
information is subject to a data breach, led forty-six states to pass similar
laws. 306 Action in one prominent state or a handful of states on
surveillance policy making by procurement could lead to a similar
snowball effect.
C.

Local Remedies

Local elected representatives have the most straightforward remedy
available to them: they can require that local police departments draft
impact assessments and data management protocols and present these
items for consideration and approval prior to applying for federal
funding. Another option, at least for larger municipalities, is to
institutionalize a privacy officer function and empower the privacy
officer to oversee municipal data management practices. The
disadvantage of depending on every local government to take one of

automated-license-plate-recognition-information.aspx [https://perma.cc/3746-6U2W] (in 2015
alone, eighteen state legislatures considered ALPR bills, four of which enacted legislation).
304. Jake Grovum, Can States Slow the Flow of Military Equipment to Police?, STATELINE (Mar.
24, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2015/3/24/can-statesslow-the-flow-of-military-equipment-to-police [https://perma.cc/N3Y8-6PSK].
305. Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1349 (1994).
306. Christopher Soghoian, An End to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging Corporate
Disclosure of User Data to the Government, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 232 (2011).
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these steps is that many municipalities will lack the resources or interest
to do so. 307
Seattle’s surveillance equipment ordinance came close to taking the
steps this Article recommends. 308 It has also inspired a few other
communities to implement or consider similar measures. The Santa
Clara County, California, Board of Supervisors recently passed an
ordinance requiring officials wishing to deploy surveillance technology
to provide an analysis of the privacy and due process impact of the
technology, to obtain approval of a use policy prior to seeking funding
for such technology, and to report annually on the use of the
technology. 309 As discussed earlier, Oakland is now at work on its own
surveillance equipment ordinance. 310 Although this is hardly a
nationwide movement, prominent civil liberties groups have begun to
throw their weight behind these ordinances, and they may yet spread.311
Another possibility, at least in mid-sized or larger municipalities, is to
create a privacy officer position with a portfolio that includes addressing
surveillance policy making by procurement. As a general matter, a
privacy officer’s job responsibilities include formulating and monitoring
compliance with privacy policies, handling public requests for access to
data as well as complaints, and serving as a general resource on privacy
and other civil liberties issues. 312 The DOJ urges all law enforcement
agencies collecting personally identifiable information to ensure that
someone within the department serves the function of a privacy
officer. 313 With respect to surveillance policy making by procurement,

307. As discussed in section III.A, while municipalities may reasonably differ on the substance of
what surveillance policies they prefer, surveillance technology use should be governed by a data
management protocol.
308. See supra section II.A.2.
309. SANTA CLARA CTY., CAL., ORDINANCE NS-300.897 (June 21, 2016).
310. See supra section II.B.2.
311. For example, the ACLU of California has developed a model ordinance to bring greater
oversight and transparency to surveillance technology acquisition and deployment, suggesting that
this organization will put resources behind seeing these types of ordinances adopted more widely.
ACLU OF CAL., MAKING SMART DECISIONS ABOUT SURVEILLANCE 25–28 (2016), https://www.
aclunc.org/docs/20160325-making_smart_decisions_about_surveillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4JZG
-XNV7].
312. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE GLOBAL ADVISORY COMM., ESTABLISHING A PRIVACY OFFICER
FUNCTION WITHIN A JUSTICE OR PUBLIC SAFETY ENTITY 1 (2014), https://it.ojp.gov/GIST/
165/File/Final-Privacy-Officer-Function-Brochure-6-17-140.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP7K-3YDR].
313. Id. at 2. Currently, the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department appears to be the
only police department in the nation with a designated, full-time privacy officer. See Angelique
Carson, She’s Not a Cop, But She’s Their CPO, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (June 23, 2015),
https://iapp.org/news/a/shes-not-a-cop-but-shes-their-cpo/ [https://perma.cc/4Z2F-C2KJ].
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the privacy officer could work with municipal agencies acquiring
surveillance technology to develop impact assessments or data
management protocols, which could then be sent to local elected
representatives to approval.
An advantage of the privacy officer model is that it gives a designated
person both the time and incentive to develop expertise on privacy
matters. A major disadvantage is cost: only a relatively small share of
municipalities will be able to afford to fund such a position. This
solution is probably most appropriate for municipalities that are
interested in addressing privacy matters not just within law enforcement
agencies, but across the board. Municipalities are under increasing
pressure to make the data they collect more readily available (commonly
known as municipal open data initiatives) and to collect more data to
improve service provision (commonly known as “smart city”
initiatives). 314 A privacy officer might be worth the investment for cities
embracing these initiatives.
CONCLUSION
For good reason, federal programs that fund local law enforcement
agencies’ acquisition of military-grade weapons and equipment have
been the subject of considerable public concern and extensive scholarly
analysis. Although their consequences are less visible, federal programs
that fund acquisition of surveillance technology by these same agencies
also merit our attention. Given the rapid pace of technological progress
over the past two decades, it is understandable that our legal framework
for disseminating and regulating surveillance technology is underdeveloped. But now that technologies such as drones and license plate
readers are both widely used and widely known, it is time for our system
of governance to catch up. The policy proposals contained in this Article
begin that work.

314. For an interesting and empirically-grounded discussion of municipal open data, particularly
relevant to the topic of this Article because it also uses Seattle as a case study, see Jan Whittington
et al., Push, Pull, and Spill: A Transdisciplinary Case Study in Municipal Open Government, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1899 (2015). While law review literature on the smart city is sparse (although
not non-existent, see, e.g., Annie Decker, Smart Law for Smart Cities, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1491
(2014)), the idea has gained considerable traction and enthusiasm among policy makers. Most
prominently, in 2015 the White House announced a $135 million “Smart Cities” initiative. See
FACT SHEET: Administration Announces New “Smart Cities” Initiative to Help Communities
Tackle Local Challenges and Improve City Services, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 14 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/14/fact-sheet-administration-announces-newsmart-cities-initiative-help [https://perma.cc/28UK-CLDA].

